

The East-West dichotomy

by Thorsten Pattberg (2009)

"The *East-West dichotomy* is a philosophical concept of ancient origin claiming that the two cultural hemispheres, East and West, developed diametrically opposed, one from the particular to the universal and the other from the universal to the particular; the East is *more* inductive while the West is *more* deductive. Together they form an *equilibrium*..."

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*East is East, and West is West,
and never the two shall meet.*

Rudyard Kipling (1895)

*A dichotomy – is any splitting of a whole
into exactly two non-overlapping parts.
Nothing can belong simultaneously to both parts.*

Wikipedia (2008)

Chapter 1: **History**

Herodotus (484 BC–425 BC), the ‘father of history’ (*Cambridge Dictionary*, 1999), was possibly the first recorded historian who deliberately portrayed the ‘east’ (Persians) and the ‘west’ (Greeks) as mutual antagonists, thereby proposing the nucleus of all ancient history. Others, Thucydides (460 BC–400 BC), and Xenephone (430 BC–354 BC), similarly, found it natural to employ strong polarities and concentrate on the ‘otherness’ of the East, while accepting the necessity of resistance to external force by defining a Western ‘self’. Thus came into being the first system of the so-called East-West dichotomy.

In another part of the world, meanwhile, the ideas of Confucian China (551 BC–479 BC) and unification was beaten into the feudal states of the Eastern Zhou period (starting in 770 BC), spurred by the constant menace of invasion by exterior barbarians.

In parallel, the Aryan masters of the Indus Valley who had long merged with the Dravidian inhabitants started to unite the tribes and founded kingdoms (1500 BC–400 BC), and as a matter of survival against aggressors from the West created their own classical Indian culture and identity in opposition to the categorical otherness of the West.

As I see it, there have been only two configurations of the East-West dichotomy throughout history. The first one was Western centred (Euro-centric; c. 500 BC–1950), the second one is Eastern centred (Asia-centric; c. 1950-). The former can be divided into Greek (c. 500 BC–0), Christian (c. 0–1500 AD) and North-Atlantic (c. 1500–1950 AD); the latter one exclusively relies on the growing influence of China and its periphery (c. 1950-) alone. To my knowledge, no other ‘centrism’ has ever prevailed on world affairs. It is said in some academic quarters that there has been a time when China was believed to be the supreme civilization, with all her great inventions like paper (220 BC), gunpowder (900 AD), printing (1040 AD), the compass (1100 AD) (Needham, 1964). Yet, to my understanding and despite those obvious accomplishments, China’s contributions to the external world, her encounter with and stance upon the Western hemisphere, has been scarce and almost insignificant. Some have argued that the “invention of the sciences” was the single decisive advantage that put the West ahead of all the other civilizations. To this, we must have serious doubts. Thousand of Greeks marched into Persia to aid Cyrus (c. 400 BC); the conquest of Alexander the Great (356-323 BC), the Romans and their emperors (27 BC-395 AD); the crusades (11th – 15th centuries); the explorations and conquests by the Mediterranean world (15th -16th centuries); the missionaries (16th-17th centuries); the colonial powers (16th -19th centuries); the subjugation of the New World (15th-16th century); the invention of the sciences (17th century); and now Globalization – are all products of the West. In a distinct succession, the West had always descended upon the “others” before they did the same: the envy of the world was the Greeks, the tormentor of the world was Christianity, and the leader of the world was Europe/America, more or less indisputable until 1950.

I would like to argue then, that with the shattering of Europe during the two world wars (1914-18 and 1938-45), the collapse of the colonial empires, the rise and (later) fall of the Soviets, and with China's first experiments with Western 'narratives' (e. g. Marxism/Communism), Asian dominance had silently set in after 1950. History speaks for itself: in the following 50 years, according to the United Nations, there were 118 wars (compared to 57 in the first half of the century), not surprisingly most of them driven or fuelled by anti-Western sentiments, most notably the Cold War (1950-1989). The U.S.A., at least involved in 60 of these wars, was defeated in Korea (1950–1953) [officially a UN operation], Vietnam (1965–1972), during the Suez-Crisis (1956) [together with Britain and France], and, most recently failed in Afghanistan (2002–2006) and Iraq (2004–2008) [both with the U.K. and other nations]. In the meantime we have seen the rapid economic development of no less than nine Eastern 'tiger-states': Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South-Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Dubai and the Philippines.

Some people say that the two poles of the East-West dichotomy had shifted twice to the outmost peripheries of the world, in the East to Japan (c. 1868-1945) and in the West to the USA (c. 1950-2006). To this I have strong objections. Japan, despite her relative military and economic power, like Great Britain, is an island state with the historical function of manipulating power-structures between the divided forces dwelling on the massive neighboring continent. However, being descendents of the great landmasses themselves (Germanic and Chinese/Korean), with a relatively small population, neither of them fits the East-West equation all on its own. The U.S.A., on the other hand, is not a civilization but a (Western) culture, living on the outer crescent of the world's pivot: Eurasia.

Mackinder (1904) early suggested, that the natural seat of power of all existing civilizations (except Latin American): Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, African, with a combined population of 5.6 Billion (or 85% of earth's population), is the continuous land-mass of Euro-Asia and the sub-continent Africa, often referred to together as the 'World Island' (Mackinder, 1994). Let us say then, that for the past 2500 years, the history that mattered most was that of the European people, continuously re-inventing themselves either through struggle against Asiatic invasion (Persians, Ottomans, Arabs etc.), or through conquest and colonization, and consequently exercising their authority over all defining paradigms in any East-West dispute, be it on a philosophical, scientific, economic, or ideological level.

Now, as all theses tends to antithesis, the balance for supremacy over the other civilizations is going to tip in favor of the ever more influential power blocks of Asia: China (with Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam etc.), Japan, and (soon) India. And, because of their cultural outlook and different set of beliefs and values, these Eastern peoples will inevitably re-define history and re-evaluate the East-West dichotomy according to the needs and benefits of their own triumphant civilization(s).

Naturally, it won't take long until they will try to dominate.

Chapter 2: Induction and deduction

西方文化注重分析，一分为二；而东方文化注重综合，合二为一。

The West is deductive, from the universal to the particular; the East is inductive, from the particular to the universal. (Ji Xianlin, 2006 [1])

According to the universal historians Arnold J. Toynbee (1889-1975) Samuel P. Huntington (1927-) and Ji Xianlin (1911-), the world's states form 21, 23 or 25 spheres, nine civilizations, and fall into four cultural systems: Arabic/Islam, Confucian, Hindi/Brahmin, and Western/Christian, with the former three forming the Oriental cultural system, and the latter one the Occidental cultural system (Toynbee, 1961; Huntington, 1993; Ji, 2006). The main difference between the Orient and the Occident, so people say, lies in their different mode of thinking: The East is inductive, the West is deductive.

Henceforth, the Orient's search for universal formulas describing balance, harmony or equilibrium: for example, in Chinese philosophy, the two lines in Chinese 二 (er, two) meaning weight and counterpoise. Similarly, we find 入入 (ru-ru, enter-enter) meaning equal weight on both sides, 巾 (liang, equilibrium) representing scales in equilibrium (Wieger, 1965), or 阴阳 (yin and yang) meaning two primal opposing but complementary forces. There are also Japanese ぜん (禅, Zen) and 空 (śūnyata, emptiness) meaning everything is inter-related; in India we find seva-nagri (the universe and I are one and the same) and tat tvam asi (thou art that) meaning that the soul is part of the universal reality.

By means of continuously inducing the universal, Confucianism, Taoism, Shinto, Hinduism and Buddhism – as a rough guide - all ultimately arrive at the universal concept of 'the One', 'Oneness of heaven and men' (tian ren he yi, 天人合一), the 'divine law' behind all Vedas, the 'merger of Brahman and atma' (Brahmatmaikyam) or 'ultimate reality' (Ayam atma bhrama), the underlying inductive principle being that:

“All observed things are connected, therefore all things are one.”

In inductive reasoning, one induces the universal “all things are one” from the particular “all things” that are “observed”. The conclusion may be sound, but cannot be certain.

In the *Bodhicaryavataṛa*, a key text of Mahayana Buddhism, Santideva (c. 650 AD) teaches us that the fate of the individual is linked to the fate of others (Williams et. al, 1998):

Hastadīrḃhadeva bahuprakaraḃ yathāikāḃ parinatyaḃīyāḃ tathā jagad bhinnamābhinnā duḃkh-sukḃāḃmakam sarvamidam tartheva.

Although our human body is made of various parts we do not feel them as separated. Likewise this world is made of various elements but it is inseparable – it is one (Santideva, 650).

In the *Abhidharma Sutra* (The Higher Teachings of Buddha) of the *Tipitaka* (c. 100 BC), Lord Buddha's says there is no 'person', 'individual' or 'I' in reality - it is all but one 'Ultimate Truth' (Tipitaka, 2008). Nagarjuna (c. 200 AD), writer of the *Madhyamika-karika*, adds: To attain Nirvana is to achieve 'absolute emptiness' (Bapat, 1956); For D. T. Suzuki [鈴木 大拙] (1870-1966) 'Zen' is about the 'Ultimate Nothingness' (Suzuki, 1994). In Hinduism, the great epic *Mahabharata* (c. 600 BC-400 AD) reads: "Yad ihasti tad anyatra yan nehasti na tat kvachit" or "What is found here, can be found elsewhere. What is not found here, will not be found elsewhere" (Mahabharata, 2008). In the *Bhagavadgita* (ca. 150 BC), Krishna says to Arjuna: "Mamaivamsho jiva-loke jiva-bhutah sanatanah" (The living entities in this conditional world are My fragmental parts, and they are eternal) (Bhagavadgita, 2008).

In the *Book of Changes* (I Ching, 易经; c. 1050-256 BC) 'One' is the supreme ultimate. In the *Dao De Jing* (道德经, c. 600 BC), Laozi [老子] says "一生二，二生三，三生万物" (One gives birth to two, two gives birth to three, three gives birth to all things) (Laozi, 42). Confucius, too, discovered the oneness of heaven (天, tian) and man (人, ren) and rejoiced: "五十而知天命" (At fifty I understood the decrees of heaven), and later: "天生德于予" (Heaven produced that virtue in me) (Confucius, *Lun Yu*, 2;4, 7;23) We find similar notions in *The Book of Mencius*: "尽其心者，知其性也；知其性则知天矣" (If you fully explore your mind, you will know your nature. If you know your nature, you know heaven) (Mencius, 7A.1), Dong Zhongshu: "天人之际，合而为一" (Heaven and men are a unit, they form the one) (Dong, 13;56) and Laozi again: "人法地，地法天，天法道，道法自然" (Man takes his law from the Earth; the Earth takes its law from Heaven; Heaven takes its law from the Tao. The law of the Tao is its being what it is) (Laozi, 25).

Note the implied universality: In the search for absolute interconnectedness, induction does not rely on categorical (formal) logic, hence the 'particular West', by inductive inference, is included in this universal 'oneness', or, as Nishitani Keiji (1900-1990) once nicely put it (Sueki, 2004):

Western modernity is to be overcome by the Eastern religious mind. (N. Keiji)

While the vigorous deductive West had to occupy foreign terrain, build churches and spread the Gospel, the inductive East entertained certain passivity, albeit with a long-term holistic world view:

We firmly believe, no matter how long it requires, the day will be with us when universal peace and the world of oneness will finally come true. (Ji Xianlin, 1996)

The West, on the other hand, separates God and the world. After all, we are not Him, but created by Him:

“Then God said, Let us make man in our image; in the image of God he created him”.

(*Old Testament*, Gen 1;31).

Accordingly, in Western classrooms we teach an analytic ‘concrete reality’ based on conditioned textual analysis and interpretation of the world, rather than a holistic ‘absolute reality’. Some examples of major works of analytical reasoning are *Euclid’s Elements* (c. 300 BC), Kant’s Copernican revolution (1787), Darwin’s *Theory of Evolution* (1859), Einstein’s *Logic of continuity* (1905), or Smith’s *The Wealth of the Nations* (1776), the underlying deductive principle (as old as the Greeks themselves) being that:

"All observed men are unique, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is unique."

In deductive reasoning, one deduces the particular “Socrates is unique” from universal “all men are unique”, relying on the premises “Socrates is a man” and “All men are unique”. The conclusion is sound and valid.

A world thus described by deductive reasoning reaches new conclusions from previously known facts ad infinitum. A world by inductive reasoning on the other hand allocates relations to recurring phenomenal patterns. We may call the former a “string of cause and effect”, whereas in the latter we see a “puzzle made of its parts”.

Accordingly, in the same way as some cultures hold belief in one, many, or no gods at all, they also have different ways of perceiving the world and reasoning about it: Western civilization became *analysis-based* while the Orient became *integration-based*.

I believe in this peculiar difference, and I suppose that most of those acquainted with Oriental thought do too. Yet, I do not believe in some ideas of two mysterious forces bound for confrontation as in *Clash of civilizations* by Samuel P. Huntington (1993), nor do I believe that one is inevitably superior and the other necessarily inferior in accumulating either wealth or wisdom as in *The Protestant Ethic* by Max Weber (1930) or in *The Eastern Religious Mind* by Nishitani Keiji (1942). There has been a difference in the independent development of the two great cultural systems, deeply embedded from their earliest history, in symbiosis with their people, and arranged according to their cultural outlooks – *deduction* and *induction*. This is what I believe.

In ‘La Route de la Soie’ Aly Mazahéri quoted this ancient Persian and Arab saying from the Sassanian Dynasty (226-c. 640 AD):

The Greeks never invented anything except some theories. They never taught any art. But the Chinese were

different. They did teach all their arts, but indeed had no scientific theories whatever.

(Aly Mazahéri, 1983; Ji, 1996)

I will not go so far as Mazahéri to say they do only this and we do only that, nor will I claim that someone is definitely deductive in outlook just because he was born in London. It is not that easy. The making of every civilization's treasures and contributions towards history is determined by its methodology for explaining the world's phenomena according to its own experience and mode of rational interpretation: The East became more inductive while the West become more deductive – this appears to be born out by all the evidence.

Let us next discuss how there has been an imbalance in the equilibrium and how Asia-centrism, after 1950, has been played its role in correcting this imbalance, and the history that led to it.

Chapter 3: The dichotomy with Asia-centrism

Man is the measure of all things. (Protagoras, c. 480-410 BC)

In the early 20th century, the influences of such great (read: radical) narratives doctrines such as Herbert Spencer's 'Social Darwinism' in *Process: Its law and causes* (1857), Friedrich Nietzsche's 'Will to power' in *Human, all too human* (1886), and Marx's *Communist Manifesto* (1848) all rooted deep in most Western academic writings on the East-West discourse. There was no sense of equilibrium and balance. In that great Darwinian struggle among nations for their survival, any inferior culture was – at the slightest sign of weakness - believed to be surely eliminated. Hence, all that behavior about superiority of race, culture, and civilization, for example in Nazi-Germany (1933-1945) or Militarist-Japan (1932-1945), but also during Stalin's revolution (1928-32), the 1915-1917 massacres of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire, or Mao's Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), but also during American cultural militarism (c. 1991-2006) to name but a few. Fortunately, another World War now seems unlikely. The world timely woke up in August 1945, when an American bomber dropped a plutonium bomb named 'Fat Man' over Nagasaki and ended World War II. Grand scale war-activities, it seemed, finally stopped at the prospect of total annihilation of entire civilizations. With Europe on her knees, but the victorious US well disposed to face the disciplined nations of the East (identified by the Warsaw pact [1955-1991] and other communist nations), soon a new warfare had been put in place, this time a mere ideological, if not total intellectual one:

According to the intrinsic powers of Western analytical reasoning over history, the East had to become westernized – gradually – by law of nature.

Similar to the extension of the universe, demonstrable after the discovery of the 'Planck constant' (Planck, 1901), or the direction of time, demonstrable by applying the 'Special theory of relativity' (Einstein, 1905), for the *analytically-based* West history has a *qualitative* nature. It has aim, it is progressive in nature, it can only improve in one direction, from a general (the universal) to a more complex stage (the particular), and advance with one truth only.

For the *integration-based* East on the other hand, what might be called 'truth' is given at any time (the 'one') and always justifiable through 'being a part of the whole'. In other words, there are many truths, many more than the West can bear, and the mere existence of the more inductive East as an alternative a priori to the more deductive West qualifies it to provide a genuine, believable non-Western experience of history: history as a non-directional but time-less tangible realm.

The integration-based East, for the greater part of its at least 5000 years of extraordinary civilization (in case of

India and China, certainly even older), nurtured the importance of inductive reasoning ability by a strong emphasis on broadening all traditional knowledge, increased their culture's memory-capacity, favored the ability to learn from analogy, and promoted high generalization skills (for example, in Asia, "yes" is the universal confirmative answer in formal dialog, even if 'no' is implied).

And, there is the Asian 'love for learning'. Already philosophically treated and discussed as early as in *Mozi* [墨子] (470– 391 BC), love for learning was officially politicized during the Legalists movement (770-221 BC). The legalists stressed the universal importance of promoting capable people as officials no matter their confession or creed. Throughout history the inductive way in Asia manifested in ever-higher inductive reasoning ability and, consequently, in cultural output (in art, religion, music, literature etc.) that values 'oneness', 'balance' and 'harmoniousness' (Gu, 1922; Sen, 2006; Wu, 1997, 1998). This 'discharge' of overall Asia's diligence, high achievement, and ancient duty of studying is best exemplified in The Analects (Lun Yu, 论语, 8;17):

学如不及，犹恐失之。

Study as if you were never to master it; as if in fear of losing it.

So, that is essentially what the intelligent Asian people were doing in the 20th century: studying as if they were never to master it. And, indeed, after long, curious "flirtations with Western culture and values" especially during the 1911 revolution and the May 4th Movement (c. 1919-1921), which were essential anti-Confucian and partly pro-Western, in the 1920's and 1930's virtually every Chinese, Japanese, or Indian intellectual was embroiled in a series of controversies about Eastern and Western culture (Ji, 2006).

Although Western theories, sciences and technologies were appreciated, most Eastern commentators were convinced that Asian values and wisdom were unique and so clear-cut diametrically opposed to many values and wisdoms to the West, that they needed to be preserved, at all cost of an inevitable intellectual crash with the West. In the fields of arts, literature and science, especially after the founding of the Communist Party in 1921, Chinese writers, politicians and historians stood up for their views on the East-West dichotomy and patriotically defended their own civilization and the 'essence of the East' (e. g. Asian thought and culture) against the infiltration of Western "scum and dregs" as asserted by Ji Xianlin: "只要拿得不过头，不把西方文化的糟粕和垃圾一并拿来，就是好事" (As long as we do not take in Western scum and dregs, it will be a good thing) (Ji, 2006 [2]), 'Western preoccupation with 'ontological being-ness' asserted by Kitaro Nishida 1870-1945 (Abe, 1988), and western-fabricated 'Orientalism' asserted by Edward Said (Said, 1978; 1995).

Following the example of Japan's modernization efforts during the Meiji Restoration in 1868-1931 to absorb Western thought and technology ('Wakon yosai' or 'Western techniques, Japanese soul'), China and its periphery, according to their 5000 years of history of learning and self-cultivation - in just under 60 years (1948-2008) - re-

actively happened to study and orientalize virtually each and every Western theory. Hands down, I mean it: virtually everything.

Notwithstanding the love for learning, Confucian China, Imperial China, and now Communist China nevertheless believed that the most important thing it already owned - 中国为本 (its Chinese-ness at the root) -, if only it could acquire from the deductive, scientific-oriented America and Europe their useful techniques and theories - 西方为末 (Westernness as a means) . In order to prevail over the West (Ji, 2006), do as the Master said:

三个行，必有我师焉；择其善者而从之，其不善者而改之。

In strolling in the company of just two other persons, I am bound to find a teacher. Identifying their strengths, I follow them, and identifying their weaknesses, I reform myself accordingly. (Confucius, Lun Yu, 7,12).

Under ‘orientalization’ we now understand the process in which Western knowledge and techniques are acquired without giving away the Asian soul – in essence a form of ideological self-reliance (自力更生), as opposed to reliance on Western ideology or westernization.

Not only China but East-Asia in general consequently ‘borrowed’ from the West whatever seemed fit: from aestheticism - in a Wildean or Byronic sense – (Zhou, 2000), architecture, art and cinema, economics, film and documentary, law, literature, sports, music, post-modern theory, through Darwinism, Marxism (e. g. the sinification of Marxism), to socialism (e. g. Socialism with Chinese characteristics) and new forms of democracy. China today openly acknowledges the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Russia and Myanmar (Burma) as ‘democratic’ nations and sees itself as ‘democratic, with Chinese characteristics’, according to each country’s own definition of what constitutes a legitimate democracy (China.org., 2005; Chinadaily, 2007/01/13). Remember the Eastern notions of many truths? That’s a no-no in the Western world, where we expect the unwavering truth - and one truth only.

China in particular never made any great attempts of covering her own truths and her aim to hold up Eastern values and wisdoms (why should the East throw away its 5000 years of successful history and culture?), and at the same time profit from the practicability of foreign learning; her ability to adopt herself, even if it meant aggressively copying from the Western others:

师夷之长技以制夷。

Study the foreigners so that you will have the upper hand over them. (Wei Yuan, 1843)

All things Western became fashionable, however the influence of true Westerners on China’s soil - as some patronizing American or European would like to imagine - as it was truly the case for example with Buddhism in

China (c. 68-800 AD) or the introduction of Western sciences by European missionaries (c. 1575-1702 AD) before, in my view, is wishful thinking. That ‘Great Learning’ from the end of the Qing Dynasty (清朝) onwards to the beginnings of the People’s Republic (1911-1949) is unmistakably ‘made in China’, an ‘intellectual property of China’, so to speak. I feel the urge to repeat this important historical fact: the rise of China is inherently Chinese, just as the Meiji Restoration (明治维新, Meiji ishin, 1868-1912) was inherently Japanese.

Yes, Lu Xun (鲁迅, 1881-1936) indeed took on some ideas of Nietzsche and developed them further. So did Li Shicen (李石岑, 1892-1934) and Mao Dun (矛盾, 1896-1981). Hu Shi (胡适, 1891-1962) took on James’s and Dewey’s ideas on education and pragmatism and developed them further. Mao Zedong (毛泽东, 1893-1976), Chen Duxiu (陈独秀, 1879-1942) and Li Dazhao (李大钊, 1888-1927) took on Marx and Lenin and developed them further. I could go on. Yet, in the intellectual output of those great cultural figures no foreigner took part; the Chinese intellectuals – no less engaged in protecting their cultural sovereignty with nationalism than the Japanese before them - read Western theories, studied Western theories, improved them - sinosized them.

In the integration-based East, where knowledge comes from traditions, ancient concepts of the inductive Eastern ‘moral superiority’ vs. Western deductive ‘scientific superiority’ were soon identified as the nucleus of the East-West dichotomy and the struggle for the ‘Eastern soul’. By all means Western technology and ways of rational inquiry – the deductive way - had to be acquired in order to defend against Western imperialism, yet it was the humanitarian Eastern soul and its wisdom – the inductive way - that should guide the East:

对西方的文化，鲁迅先生曾主张“拿来主义”。这个主义至今也没有过时。过去我们拿来，今天我们仍然拿来，只要拿得不过头，不把西方文化的糟粕和垃圾一并拿来，就是好事，就对我们国家的建设有利。

In case of Western culture, Lu Xun earlier proposed the ‘take-in approach’. This has ever since been our practice. In the past we took in, and today we are still taking in. As long as we steer calm, not taking in the waste and garbage of Western culture too, this will be a good thing for the construction of our nation.

(Ji Xianlin, 2006 [3])

Lu Xun proposed to “return a plum” (Ji, 2006). So does the Chinese tradition in the *Book of Songs*, Da Ya (诗经, 大雅): “投我一桃，报之以李 (If you give me a peach, I shall return a plum), meaning to practise a ‘give-and-take’ attitude (送去主义). Unfortunately, Mao Zedong, realizing that the capitalist West would never except his plum - with reference to Luo Guanzhong’s [罗贯中] war epic *Romance of the Three kingdoms* (San Guozhi, 三国演义, c. 1330-1400 AD) that reads: “三十年河西，三十年河东” (Thirty years west of the River, thirty years east of it) (Luo, 1998) - made a mockery out of Lu Xun’s ‘give-and-take’-mentality and blew all culturalism of tolerance to the wind, literally:

我认为现在国际形势到了一个新的转折点。世界上现在有两股风：东风，西风。中国有句话：“不是东风压倒西风，就是西风压倒东风。我认为目前形势的特点是东风压倒西风，也就是说，社会主义的力量对于帝国主义的力量占了压倒的优势。

I believe that the international situation has now reached a new turning point. There are two Winds in the world, the East Wind and the West Wind. There is a Chinese saying that “either the East Wind prevails over the West Wind or the West wind prevails over the East wind.” I believe it is characteristic of the situation today that the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind. That is to say, the forces of socialism have become overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism. (Mao Zedong, 1957)

In the latter half of the 20th century, just as the West aggressively propagated its own political values, so did the East. The ‘soul of Asia’ had to be internalized by each and every member of its collective Eastern societies obedient to a universal Asiatic ‘code of conduct’ (e. g. Confucian conduct) driven by the Eastern notion of ‘oneness’. Some may call it a collective defense mechanism against the Western ‘particulars’, only this time using neo-Darwinian terminology in the spirit of Darwin (and later Spencer) and their prophetic biology that “bids all to eat and to be eaten in their turn” (Darwin, 1859 [1]). If interest in biological survival embraces political resolutions, one may call it ‘nationalism’.

Finally, the spiritual East finally identified the material West as the sole competitor for everything that is worthwhile in life: culture, values, wealth and dignity. Yet, because of its inductive cognitive ways, the East could only perceive the West as the short-sighted, destructive force of millions of self-determined individuals who spread out and conquer nature and undermine the great harmony, constantly neglecting the oneness of all things, and dwelling in the minuscule particular. What was worse, back home the West had formed nation states as political tool to bundle and channel the disruptive forces of its army of independent, egoistic, shameless, and often utterly lonely individuals.

Not surprisingly, Europe-style nationalism and Europe-style concepts of cultural superiority soon became very fashionable in the East, too, for example with eugenics in China. Until recently, the prevailing notion among many Chinese anthropologists, the Communist Party of China, and Chinese college textbooks well into the 21st century was that the Chinese race exclusively developed from the ‘Peking man’, or ‘homo erectus”, whose remains were, so we are told, first discovered in 1923-1928 by Davidson Black (1884-1934) and Pei Wenzhong (裴文中, 1904-1982) during excavations in Zhou Koudian (周口店) – now a UNESCO World Heritage Centre - near Beijing dated roughly 500,000 years ago, while the European races were believed to be the result of a communion between homo sapiens and the lesser Neanderthal man. This interpretation of history was challenged twice in 1985 by Lewis Binford (1930-) and Chuan Kun Ho (1945-), who argued that the Peking Man was a scavenger (Binford and Chuan, 1985), and finally in 1998—2004 by a team of computational biologists and anthropologists around Jin Li (金力), who used methods from molecular genetics to demonstrate that the Chinese race, like everyone else too,

descended from Homo sapiens and the African continent in accordance with the 'single-origin hypothesis' (Jin, 1998).

That - mostly Han - Chinese dream of racial exclusivity, not different in good intention from all other premium contenders such as the British, Germans, Japanese, and Americans before them, fortunately lost its scientific grounds. Yet, other forms of cultural superiority in Asia remain, such as 'Dahan zhuyi' (大汉族主义, the chauvinistic Han), Nihonjin-ron (Japanese uniqueness), the Vasudeva (the supreme man) etc. - all highly complex models not so much of biological but more of moral superiority or even intellectual superiority (we come to that later); many of them translated into party-slogans, public policies and literature movements.

In order to integrate ideology with man successfully - again, the concept of 'the one' -, not an industrial revolution that manipulates matters, but a cultural revolution that manipulates minds had to take place.

What followed – in the spirit of a neo-Darwinian's 'biologized' society - I call the "husbandry of ideas". The notion, that ideas can be refined and perfected, just as domestic animals were over the last 2000 years, by a strict and controlled selection and maintenance processes, if only enough intelligentsia were employed to do so:

如此循环往复，一次比一次更正确，更生动，更丰富。

And so on, over and over again in an endless spiral, with the ideas becoming more correct, more vital and richer each time. (Mao Zedong, 1943; 1967)

The above quote from Mao Zedong sounds ruthless and painful, mainly perhaps because he speaks in his function as a political leader (and known dictator). Who wants to be so openly manipulated by a politician? But nevertheless what Mao said is essentially at the core of all religious movements and any other mass movement you and I can think of, and, of course, repetition is the very essence of all behavioral modification and psychological conditioning. It is the simple act of "value creation". Any personal action causes a result, and that result itself is the truth about the direction and intention of the cause. The repetitive action then constantly confirms our direction and intention. Hence, it does not matter how much a scientist decries the existence of God: as long as some people believe in God, that God is the truth about the cause that leads to Him.

Could the principles of husbandry and selection, which we have seen to be so potent in the hand of a breeder, apply to social and political affairs? It did so in the former Soviet Union and Germany's government under Hitler; both explicitly using propaganda that favoured communism or fascism in all forms of media, literary and public expression.

In case of China, we see the systematical ideological indoctrination of Chinese pupils in over 500,000 schools

and 1,750 universities and colleges till today (2007) during weekly political classes at junior high-school and university level in 毛泽东思想概论 (Thoughts of Mao Zedong), 思想道德修养 (Moral Education), 邓小平理论 (Deng Xiaoping's theory), 马克思主义哲学原理 (Marxism), 社会主义初级阶段 (Introduction to Socialism), and at primary school level in 思想品德 (Character and moral education), with exam-results as crucial for the children as the ones in mathematics or physics. Finally we have the Ministry of Education's 'model scholars 模范学者' out there virtually reading new Chinese Nationalism and unity into the bullhorn:

As far as East-West issues are concerned, we practically know the West like the palm of our hand, but the West's vision of the East is a murky confusion. It is thus self-evident who would hold an advantageous position should there be any conflict in the future between the two. (Ji Xianlin - in Lin, 1996)

Meanwhile, after jointly winning the Great War in 1948, those self-exiled remnants of the European civilization, calling themselves the U.S.A., by now militarily and economically evolved into a European warrior-based culture, returned to Eurasia and essentially revived Europe, swept through this former cradle of capitalism, democracy and the free market economy, refined all theories, and build its military and cultural bases all over the place, yet with their eyes fixed on the perceived menaces from Asia.

East and West as a result became competitors for better theories, with an Eastern affinity for hyperbole, gigantisms and holistic totality – the glorifications of idols and leaders, state-monopolies, authoritarianism, and autarchy - : “东方红, *The East is Red*” (Mao Zedong, 1960), which is also the name of a song, anthem of the CCP during the 60's, and the name of a satellite that carried a radio transmitter broadcasting the song in 1970; and a Western affinity for an historical 'sense of mission' to dissolve and deconstruct the seemingly coherent Eastern cultures and take the lead: “The United States is the locomotive, the rest of the world is the caboose” (Dean Acheson, 1940).

As a result of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) - Mao, in his famous essay '*On New Democracy*' (新民主主义论, 1964) called it “新的世界革命” or 'The New World Revolution') - and the 'de-Westernization' of Asia and 'de-colonialism' in other parts of the world during the second half of the 20th century (Lee, 1998; Sisci, 2008), the two hemispheres East and West drifted apart, with the remaining inflow of Western ideas and standards (e. g. trials of re-westernization) often seen as the gongs and drums of a recovering barbarian, more or less until China's opening up (1978/79) and the breakdown of the communist Soviet Union (1991).

When Donella H. Meadows *The Limits to Growth* was published in the United States in 1972 - the first scientific study on the decline of the West that was not pure philosophical and speculative, like the theories of Herbert Spencer (1857) and Arthur Toynbee (1958), but this time computational and methodical - it became clear to the West that its deduction-based 'materialistic civilization' would one day run into its limits:

Chapter 4: **Equilibrium**

This so called ‘Crisis of the materialistic Civilization’ (Meadows, 1972; Husserl, 1970), the West, was supposed, of course, to go hand in hand with the ‘Revival of the spiritual Civilization’ (Kim, 2006), the East. In order to prevent our planet’s ecological system from the ultimate collapse, the deductive-based and nature-abusing West had to learn – so goes Meadows argument - four important lessons (Meadows, 1972):

- i) The world is but one.
- ii) The earth is limited, materials are limited, and therefore economic growth is limited.
- iii) All the temporal alterations are going in circulation. All phenomena are but alterations rather than developments.
- iv) Human interference with the ecological order will harm Nature; balance is needed to maintain the universal evolution and harmony in Nature.

Needless to say, the four findings i-ii-iii-iv above neatly correspondent to those induction-based, more intuitive Eastern concepts such as ‘oneness of Man and Heaven’ (天人合一), ‘harmonious society’, ‘re-occurrences in history’, and ‘the non-linear concepts of time’. With only two alternatives, the Eastern and Western way, it seems necessary that if the West stopped being Western, it would have to become Eastern. That is exactly what - the other way round - the West thought the East was supposed to become, namely a copy of the West.

Meadows’ Limits (1972) were published during the Cold War (1950-1989). Imagine the frustrated uproar in some Western intellectual circles. Naturally, millions of Asian hearts - and many sympathizers - will doubtless have filled with ‘schadensfreude’ on hearing that there would be a ‘reckoning’ for the sins of the Western colonialist, imperialist and capitalists. Soon, sensationalism on either side ruled the day, with media and commentators picking up clichés such as ‘Confucian Renaissance’, ‘the enlightenment of the West towards a more harmonious society’ or the triumph of ‘Asian values’. The hasty – if not premature – conclusion of many scholars was this:

The declining West seemed morally bankrupt. That was believable because, like all other human relationships, the East-West relationship should have been based not only on mutual respect (which in this case it never did) but also should have offered the simple lesson of reciprocity, e. g. ‘give-and-take’ or “For every gain there is a loss”, or “Baoying” (报应, retribution), or just ‘good or bad karma’. But with its attitude of conquer, divide, and rule, the West had simply overstretched itself (Spencer, 1857).

Ever since the European enlightenment and the industrial revolution, the technological advanced West subjugated the spiritual Eastern nations and taught the scientific ways, thereby inevitably helping Asia and all other nations to develop (助长) and grow, yet “the teacher had refused to appreciate his pupils”, to engage with them,

and learn enough in return from their intuitive, induction-based traditions.

We have already mentioned the profound love for learning and the respect for traditions in Eastern societies. As a consequence, the teacher-student relationship in Asia has always been far more spiritually important and guided by mutual respect, love and humility than in all Western societies. One can only guess at the emotional abuse Asia, as a kind, ancient, proud and exceptionally intelligent civilization, suffered from the often kindless, very oppressive and unrequited “love-relationship” of the Western master and his Asian pupil, which reminds one of that *Mad World-song* by Gary Jules:

Made me feel the way that every child should, sit and listen; Went to school and I was very nervous, no one knew me; Hello teacher tell me what's my lesson, look right through me” (Jules, 2006).

Western societies “looked right through” the Eastern pupils; there was simply nothing to learn from “a boy of 12”, as General Douglas MacArthur said, for example, about the Japanese, “as compared to our own development of 45 years” while commenting in front of the US Senate Committees on the Army and on Foreign Relations (Shibusawa, 2006).

Understandably, now that Meadows’ *Limits* (1972) were published, many Asians believed that the day Western master’s material growth stagnated would be the day when their faithful Asian pupils would offer their spiritual advice and wisdom (about harmoniousness, alternative world-views, the oneness of nature and man etc.) - so far in theory (Toynbee, 1958; Zaehner, 1976; Thoreau, 1988; Ji, 2006). The very opposite occurred, of course.

In praxis, as we all know, economic growth – although more or less stagnated in Western Europe and America - still went rampant and plentiful in developing places of ‘westernized’ Asia, albeit with the huge presence of Western companies and corporate money. The West, it seems, wasn’t exhausted as long as there are still growth opportunities, overseas markets and material resources to lay its hands on. Therefore, in this 21st century, in Asia some commentators are still asking the same question back in the 70’s: when will Asian values or belief systems finally start to show a measurable impact on those Western invaders, and, even more important: will the East be able to ‘give’ out as much as it is able to ‘take’ in (Wu, 2007)?

The evidence shows, the Eastern way has some influence on the West, a strengthening of the East is already in the making, although the deduction-based narcissist West, who got itself lost, to use the words of Aby-Lughod, in a universe of “vulgar and utterly finicky, atomistic details”, for the time being is unable to see through the natural greater scheme of things (Ng, 1998; Wu, 1997, 1998; Wallerstein, 2005; Chirot, 1991; Aby-Lughod, 1989), just as the ‘white West’ failed to anticipate its ethnic suicide (Heinsohn, 2003, 2005), and the West’s failure (or the failure of their economic and social theories) to predict the rise of East-Asia (Lin, 2006).

For, in having been able to resist Western imperialism and colonialism – above all a moral victory – and easily forming by far the most populous nations on the ‘world-island’, Asia now accounts for 65% of the world’s population and Europe for only 11%. With contempt for Western aggressions and, in case of Russia and China, no need to feel intimidated by the Western powers any longer, Asia-centrism in geopolitical terms had set in after the 1950s, thus - in my estimation - long before the two giants, China and India, had their respective economies (c. 1990-2007) to prove it.

Today’s de-Westernization is not only taken place in the obvious places like China, Japan, Russia, Korea etc., but also in the Middle East, Africa, and South-East Asia. Many people have serious doubts about the West, its intentions and deeply flawed views. Ultra-nationalist bestsellers like *The Japan that can say No* (1989) by Akio Morita and Shintaro Ishihara, and *China can say No* (1996) by Song Qiang (宋强) et al. are among the more sympathetic readings, both strongly opposing the Caucasian world order and Western values (Morita, 1989; Song, 1996). Why should Japanese culture bow down to America’s corporate culture’s fits? Why are China or India with their histories of 5000 years and 2,5 billion people not wise enough and many enough to resist this adolescent monkey business of the US, with regards to teaching Asia a lesson on human rights, democracy, and statecraft, while “pre-emptively” bombing the Middle East into pieces and torturing ‘enemy combatants’ at Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp on the shore of Cuba (Human Rights Watch, 2003; Amnesty International, 2005)?

Remarkably, the East-West dichotomy, as if an invisible hand dealt the right cards, still persists to determine world affairs and history despite long and enduring phases of centrism, trials of expansion, colonialism and empire, alliances and ganging-ups, rivalry or false beliefs in superiority. What makes us think then that the disparity of East and West can be best explained by anything other than a *law of nature*? Is there a scientific ‘dualism’, similar to that of Valentinovich G. Plekhanov (1856-1918), founder of ‘dialectical materialism’, who says that science entails contradictions inherited in all natural and social phenomena called ‘laws of dialectics’ [science of contradictions] (Plekhanov, 1891)? Is there a law of ‘difference’, similar to Jaques Derrida’s (1930-2004) concept of ‘différance’ suggested in his masterpiece *De La Grammatologie* (1967) in which he successfully argues that the prime function of all languages and thoughts is ‘differing’ – the ‘differentiation’ of signs from each other (Derrida, 1967)?

As for common sense, a people’s good intentions, or bad ones, are useless to interfere with scientific laws. If there is a scientific reason behind why the all-so powerful West never dies, yet on the other hand, no matter how many trials of conquest, colonialism, and intimidation, never turned the East into the West either; is there not a quench of realism in the idea to assume that the very dichotomy of East and West is essentially a natural trait of the human race? Is there a law of nature that pushed East and West in diametrical opposed directions, one becoming *more* inductive, the other becoming *more* deductive, yet managed to *balance* both hemispheres – the Eastern *inductive ways* as well as the Western *deductive ways* - in a grand global scheme upon all available geography?

Alas, no humanist wants to hear a theory that equals the evolution of our precious homo sapiens to the happenings of some dualistic virus that somehow achieved a perfect East-West equilibrium. The day we discover such a rare dualistic creature in the animal kingdom however might change all that...

Until then, in order to answer those questions, some key areas can indeed be discussed in which a possible unintended yet synchronized behavior of the integration-based East and analysis-based West has clearly played a role in keeping a relative equilibrium during the last 50 years of 'catching-up-with-the-West' Asia-centrism.

Chapter 5: Demography

Why are the people thus busily moving?

For food they are seeking, children they fain would beget, feeding them all as they can.

Traveler, mark this well, and when thou art home, do thou likewise!

More can no mortal effect, work with what ardor he will.

(Johann W. Goethe, 1790)

With the decline of Europe during the Great War, the multiethnic USA survived as the only counterweight to the overwhelmingly racial homogeneous countries of the East - Han in China 92%, Japanese in Nippon 99%, Koreans in Korea 99% and the Soviet empire of 450 million people. During the next few decades of reconstructing Europe, all major Eastern cultures, often driven by political utopian dreams, increased their population so dramatically as if to prove Malthus (1766-1834) wrong:

中国人口众多是一件极大的好事。再增加多少倍人口也完全有办法，这办法就是生产。

The massive population of China is our greatest good. Even a further increase of several times the population is entirely possible, possible through productivity. (Mao Zedong, 1960 Vol. 4)

Thomas Malthus, English philosopher, made his famous prediction in *An essay on the principle of population* (1798) that population growth would at some point in time outrun food supply, and hence that the world population must have a maximum limit – anything between 9-12 billions. Naturally, until that overall, final limit is reached, some nations would try, almost fanatically in case of Mao's China until the early 80's, or not try at all, in case of post-war Germany after the 50's who officially discouraged children, to outperform each other, for instance by means of forbidding contraception, ruling out gay communions, encouraging matchmaking, rewarding 'patriotic' baby-making, or discouraging women from joining the labor force (Heinsohn, 2003 [1]). Nippon increased from 60 to 127 millions, India from 550 to 1100 millions, China exploded in population from 600 to over 1,350 million, the citizens of the Soviet Union grew from 100 to 450 million (by assimilation), and finally the entire Arab/Moslem population almost tripled to now 1,400 million (with Indonesia from 75 to 220 million, Pakistan from 39 to 167 million etc.) (geohive, 2008; ciaFact, 2008).

As I write this paper, the populations of China and India have each increased by 20 million in the last 18 months, close to the size of that of Australia. That is of course a far cry from back in 2000, when China reported 36 million 'millennium babies' (*Chinadaily*, 2007/10/10). For modern European standards, such figures are utopian and utterly mind-boggling. And it does not stop here: In 2007, in just one of its 22 provinces, Henan, China saw a birth-rate of roughly 1,2 million Chinese babies, some 500,000 more than y that same year, let alone that 28% of the 'German babies' were of non-German ethnic background (destasis, 2006). Tens of thousand million babies is a

post-modern sin, even for a proud and superior civilization like China. So, Henan local authorities, reminded of their outrageous high birthrates of 1,6 million annually during the 90's, had to vow to Beijing not to exceed the province's projected population of 110 millions before 2020 (Chinadaily, 2008/04/20). To put this into perspective: During the Olympic Year in Beijing 2008, 20 million Chinese were born in mainland China. And this, despite the 'One-child policy' from 1971, although heavily relaxed, still being in place (there are many exceptions to the policy, and minorities and rich folks are exempted anyway, but we won't go into that here). Growing at this rate, the world's entire WWII war dead (roughly 72 million people, including all casualties of famine [!]) are replaced by China alone in a little under 4 years; adding the babies from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the WWII losses are remedied in just under 1 1/2 years by our Asian partners. In a mocking way, it is Darwin not or perhaps deliberately not knowing for whom else he is speaking:

In this case we can clearly see that if we wished in imagination to give the plant the power of increasing in number, we should have to give it some advantage over its competitors. (Charles Darwin, 1859 [2])

However, in the short run between 1950 and 2000, the doctrine of Darwin (and, in politics, Marx) had disappointed its people, and so did the practice of Social Darwinism as a nominal imperative: Numbers (and mind you, it is always about numbers!) of citizens did not immediately translate into global dominance. Something rather counter-intuitive happened, as the believed outcome of the struggle for survival against the West failed to materialize:

If two great regions had been for a long period favorably circumstanced in an equal degree, the battle would be prolonged and severe; [...]. But in the course of time, the forms dominant in the highest degree, wherever produced, would tend everywhere to prevail. As they prevailed, they would cause the extinction of other and inferior forms, [...] (Charles Darwin, 1859 [3])

What Darwin had anticipated for the plants and animal kingdoms - that biological mass or discipline (instinct) of a group leads to victory - seemed technically absurd: Although the Caucasian population in the U.S.A., Britain, Germany and France declined in relation to most other great Asian nations, these countries assimilated quite well the mass-migration from the East into the West. On the contrary, the West was able to profit from its newly won diversity, calling it 'multiculturalism', the only "minor" problem being that of successful integration: Already in 2007, in Amsterdam, the capital of The Netherlands, 47% of its 750,000 inhabitants were ethnic minorities, 60% of children in primary schools were of non-Dutch background (van Antwerpen, 2007). The influx of Asians and other Orientals, and also Eastern Europeans and Africans) had left a great impact (read also: pressure), on the US, EU, Canada, Australia and other Western countries for example, as they are chosen by foreign diasporas, who have for various reason often more children than the domestic populations (Heinsohn, 2005).

Soon, commentators picked up clichés such as ‘moral conquerors’, ‘spiritual invasion’ (Freytag, 1940/2004) ‘Counter-Colonialism’, ‘the Gradual Orientalization of the Western Culture’, a ‘Pacific Century’, meaning that the 21st century will be dominated by the Pacific Rim states surrounding the Pacific Ocean, including China, Japan and the United States (Gibney, 1992; PBS, 1993, Borthwick, 1998), ‘The Chinese Enlightenment to the West’, ‘Eastern take-over’ or ‘Clash of Civilizations’ (Huntington, 1993, 2000, 2004) – all these notions supported by popular academic data saying that conformist East Asians and individualistic Westerners - apart from having shaped two entirely different civilizations, one inductive-based, the other deduction-based, indeed seem to produce different general cognitive styles too; the members of the latter tend to reason more analytically, the members of the former tend to reason more holistically (Masuda and Nisbett, 2001).

The demographic changes in Europe are irreversible, and the former feelings of Western superiority – the analytical mind, the linear approach to time and history, the soul of the conqueror, the deductive ways – over the time will proportionally decrease in favor of a newly felt Eastern superiority – the intuitive mind, the holistic approach to time and entangled history, the soul of the sage, the inductive ways.

As a matter of perception, till today, the Western ways are universally associated with ‘war’, ‘aggression’, and ‘exclusiveness’, while the Eastern ways are associated with ‘peace’, ‘tranquility’, and ‘inclusiveness’; notwithstanding both hemispheres showing the tendencies to project their own psychological outlook onto the other. For the vast majority of Americans and Europeans, Asia is a place for all those fanatics, dictators, terrorists, and immature cultures. For the Asians, the West - despite its cruelties and flaws - is often seen as the savior who brings stability, happiness and peace to the world:

As a consequence of ‘psychological projection’, the West does not see clearly its own vices, and the East does not see clearly its own virtues.

Due to current demographic developments, Europe is going to change and will have to accept more of the Eastern inductive ways. Or does it? It will take some time, to say the least. The non-integrated, spiritual Muslims in Germany, Austria or the Netherlands, who still feel as second-class citizens. as a minority are not alone in Europe (Times, 2008/07/27; taz, 2008/02/12). In Britain, France, Spain, Italy too, most of their Muslim, Asian or East-Asian counterparts (may it be Turks, Algerians, Chinese, Sikhs etc.) – who will anyway represent 53% of the European population by 2100 – still report a hard time to adjust to the – from their perspective – very limited way of Western thinking. Many of Eastern immigrants, including most of the Europeans themselves, believe that European culture has killed the Indians, developed slavery, colonized and exploited the Third World, brought war and misery to the human cause, and, in its most extreme form of expression: thus should be cleaned from the surface of the world, obviously not by war but by silent assimilation. In Berlin, it is not uncommon for a white German woman to be labeled ‘snobbish’ or even plain ‘racist’ just because she chooses a white German partner,

instead of, to show her “tolerance” and, yes, common-sense, choosing a non-white spouse. It has become, in the language of the youth, “hip” in Europe to “go non-white”.

The new spiritual conquerors’, with their Eastern religions, Eastern values, Eastern world views, and their inductive ways demand for more power and influence in their host countries of choice and they are lobbied by approximately three billion other Indians, Chinese, Muslims, South-East Asians etc. While Europe and the USA are volunteering to ‘transform’ their indigenous cultures, China, India, Singapore, Hong Kong etc. are all happy to assimilate those few (relative in numbers) ‘Western runners’ (Westerners hardly ever call themselves immigrants, they prefer the exclusive, high-status term ‘expatriates’ or ‘expats’ while abroad) who turn their back on their deconstructed, seemingly dying civilization, and search for refuge into the strong and massive Eastern hemisphere, but, alas, although finding themselves extraordinary and useful with their deductive, analytical ways and deconstructive skills, as lone individuals with an impact no less but also no greater than a water drop seeking depth into the vast sea of Eastern inclusive ‘harmoniousness’ and universal ‘oneness’.

In the short run, the few young indigenous Europeans who have not yet immigrated into the Anglo-Saxon world (Heinsohn, 2003; Breithaupt, 2000) or found some purpose in the East, will stay on their home turf and indeed benefit from their continent’s accumulated wealth, with ever fewer people sharing that wealth. In the long term, however, their parents, companies, and governments will have to make a painful but crucial financial decision:

There is nothing complicated about finance. It is based on old people lending to young people. [...] Never before in human history, though, has a new generation simply failed to appear. (*aTimes*, 2008/05 [Spengler])

The aging European’s search for their “next generation”, may it be citizens for their cities, tenants for their houses, consumers, students, employees, spouses, or just new ideas, has already begun – they look to the East.

Whoever said that “victory makes you liberal while defeat makes you conservative” must have deeply understood the meaning of life. The European people in the 21st century suffer from their childlessness, defenselessness, and dependency, and thus developed a pervasive fear of everything Asian. Does this new 21st century existential ‘*angst*’ resemble that old 20th century existential angst, so accurately portrayed in images of the ‘*Yellow Terror*’ such as: Wilhelm II.’s painting *Völker Europas, wahrt eure heiligsten Güter* (People of Europe, safeguard your most valuable goods) which depicts the European nations standing on a cliff guarding against a mighty Buddha and his thunderstorm (wikipedia, 2008); or such as the short stories written by Matthew Phipps Shiel, in 1898, who brutally frankly familiarized Westerners with the term *The Yellow Peril*? How about the fear for Islamic Extremists? Or about the fear for mass-immigration out of Africa and the Middle East? Is there anything in this 21st century that Europeans are *not afraid* of? Does this new 21st century existential ‘*angst*’

resemble the old pessimistic sorrows of an Oswald Spengler or an Arnold Toynbee, who successfully summarized ‘angst’ in their *The Decline of the West* (1918) and *Civilization on Trial and the World and the West* (1958)? Which also brings to mind Willhelm Marr’s controversial book *Finis Germaniae* about the decline of the Germanic people (to which also belong the Anglo-Saxons belong) (Marr, 1879; Heihnson, 2006; Fülberth, 2007). If ‘angst’ still reigns over Europe, it did not come as a surprise when the CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion of Germany published its ‘Asia-strategy-paper’ on the 23rd of October 2007, officially calling China a “threat to European values, economic and political development” (Schröder, 2008; Spiegel, 2008/07/15). Is that paper reflecting merely diplomatic ‘foolishness’ and the insecurity of its authors, or is it just true and genuine ‘fear’? Presumably, it is a bit of both, and shows that Germany is on her retreat, emotionally and spiritually, and is not prepared to compromise on her (Western) values, no matter how eminent the fact that 98% of humankind is not German, would not want to join Germany or be labeled German, and already sees the Chinese as valuable economic and political partners to Europe, not as a threat. But the above example gives us an idea about the ‘psychology of failure’ (in this case, two world wars) and the wish to stand up for something meaningful again, in this case for ‘Western values’ while at the same time discredit or even deny such a thing as ‘Asian values’. That this, consequentially, also means to render all non-Western societies as inferior or immature, does not and will never come to Germany’s cultural mind, naturally, if you studied European history – and especially 18th to 20th century German orientalism (Pattberg, 2009). So, a so-called “revolution of the spirit”, a turn in its attitude towards China in the case of Germany, but just like any other European nation, must come first and foremost from within the heart, in this case, the blend of Eastern spirit that slowly incorporates into the minds of the Europeans by migration of more and more Easterners into the European heartland.

In the latter half of the 20th century and in this century, the new spiritual strength of the integration-based Orient derived from the explosion in population translated into a new self-confidence and assertiveness and the re-affirmation of (superior) Asian values and pan-Asianism, the old notion that Asia indeed is the unifying ‘one’, while the West is the destructive other:

(...) that broad expanse of love for the Ultimate and Universal, which is the common thought-inheritance of every Asiatic race, enabling them to produce all the great religions of the world, and distinguishing them from those maritime peoples of the Mediterranean and the Baltic, who love to dwell on the Particular, and to search out the means, not the end, of life. (Okakura Kakuzo, 1904)

(...) no description of Hinduism can be exhaustive which does not touch on almost every religious and philosophical idea that the world has ever know... (M. Monier Williams, 1894)

(...) It is all-tolerant, all-compliant, all-comprehensive, all-absorbing. (S. Radhakrishnan, 1929)

(...) European culture has the ability to master energy and mechanics, but has only elementary knowledge regarding the human body and the concert of mind and brain. The Middle and the Far East (however) have an advance of thousand years on the West. (Claude Lévi Strauss, 1952)

The modern idea of 'pan-Asianism' and the slogan "Asia is one" were first discussed in Okakura Kakuzo's groundbreaking book *The Ideals of the East* (1904), but became really popular again in the 90's during the academic discourse on 'Asian values': 'Asian values' is a vague concept of certain religious and spiritual tendencies, traditions and virtues like filial piety, love for learning, collectivism, and inner-world dependency that are shared by most Asian (some say only Confucian) cultures, but not - or not equally - stressed in most Western societies (Lee, 1998), thus forming a self-affirming psychological counterpoise, and thus source of conflict to those Western values of conflict, liberalism, individualism, and outer-world dependency.

Another major blow to Western over-confidence was the genetic challenge. According to The Wall Street Journal: "American-Asian minorities (3.5%) account for more than 20-30% in American top universities" (wsj, 1999/11, 2006/11), and since the 1920s it is known, and has been proven independently by J. P. Rushton and A. J. Jensen (2006), A. J. Herrnstein and C. Murray (1994), J. R. Flynn (1980, 1994), and I. J. Deary (2001) etc., that East-Asians on average do score six to seven points higher than Anglo-Americans, and twenty points higher than Afro-Americans on most (Western-) standardized IQ-tests (Rushton et. al, 2006; Herrnstein et. al, 1994; Flynn, 1980, 1994; Deary, 2001; Steinberg, 1994). This is readily available science; no one is in the dark any longer. Indeed, the cognitive pre-eminence of East-Asians in several intellectual and artistic disciplines is as fascinating and terrifying to look at as, for instance, watching the average dominance of Afro-American basketball players in the NBA (Flynn, 1994; Ledderose, 2005).

Combining the high test-results of Asians with student numbers and things are getting even more impressive: In 2005, China, still a developing country, announced it had 19 million undergraduate and graduate students enrolled on the mainland, without Hong Kong and Taiwan (CNET, 2005/08/30). Britain, in the same year, had hardly 2.3 million students, of whom 300,000 were foreign nationals, over 51,000 of them Chinese anyway (BBC, 2007/03/27).

The cultural and economic penalty for not recognizing East-Asian talent is immense, and unsurprisingly in this century we have witnessed in particular the anglophone world recruiting Chinese students and immigrants in unprecedented numbers. In 2005, 65,000 Chinese and 75,000 Indians studied in the US; 60,000 and 20,000 in Britain (IIE, 2006; *People Daily*, 2006/04/05). For comparison, only 6,800 US students came to China, most of them American ethnic Chinese or 'hai gui' (海龟, sea turtles) (Chinadaily, 2005/12/20). With this trend came 'political correctness' and the need to talk about *culture* and *cultural values* (e. g. Fukuyama, Huntington etc.), rather than *races* and *phenotypes* (e. g. Herrnstein, Flynn etc.):

Genetic differences among individual human beings account for up to 85 percent of the entire genetic spectrum, while the genetic differences in the world population are only about 15 percent. No matter which ethnic group you come from, we're all pretty much the same. (Jin Li [金力], 2006)

To conclude, in discussing demography, 'Cultural evolution' can so much better explain than its abusive father, 'biological evolution' and its damaged mother, 'social evolution'. Indeed, the huge transformation of Western key societies into fissiparous, multicultural hubs fits the equation of the East-West equilibrium as a global theory: Migration is in direct reciprocity, for the greater good, a strategy of mutual cooperation and – unconsciously, but we'd rather say voluntary – the natural response to any human demographic shortcomings on this planet. Without having to care about race, but this time only about culture, Western ranks are filled with an over-surplus of human capital from the East; as diverse as possible, please. It serves both sides, thus benefits the whole. The analytical-based, deductive West increases its diversity, tendency for devolution and multiculturalism and is thus profiting from Eastern 'overproduction' of human capital that is required to keep Western culture breathing, while the integration-based East increases its ethnic dominance and geopolitical reach, forcing ever greater levels of peace, tolerance and harmoniousness upon the West.

Chapter 6: **Migration**

As a rule, for any society that is single-mindedly interested in its own promotion and thus survival and preservation, it would have to have a huge population and it would have to send its people out, not letting too many others in.

The European nation states send a lot of people out, but do not have huge populations, and let everyone in. The United States have a huge population, but send not enough out, and let everyone in. Japan has a big population, lets no one in, but sends few out. China, India and the Islamic world come very close to that ideal.

Chapter 7: Cultural effects of the dichotomy

In 1275, Marco Polo famously reported about Cathay's (China) pompous cities, stupendous power and incredible wealth (Pelliot & Moule, 1938). But the first encounter of scale and cultural significance between East and West were the many Jesuit missions during the late Ming Dynasty in 1540-1702. Indeed, Matteo Ricci (1552-1610), Francis Xavier (1505-1552), and Jean Adam Schall von Bell (1519-1566), like most other Jesuit missionaries in Asia, came, saw, and wrote extensively about the Chinese civilization that – despite its numerous follies and shortcomings – in many ways was not only superior in size and number, but its people also “more polite, delicate and gentle in nature”, and thus outclassed the West not only “in scope of its economies”, and in terms of its “sympathetic, true human intelligence” (Gu, 1922), but also in its awareness of its sophisticated moral code and perceived antiquity (Hart, 1999):

It is well-known fact that the liking - you may call it the taste for the Chinese - grows upon the foreigner the longer he lives in this country. (Gu Hongming, 1922)

Despite the achievements of the Jesuits in the 17th century in China, one should not merely attribute their successes to the curiosity of the Chinese intellectuals, or the expertise and advanced scientific training of the Catholic Church, but perhaps more so to the cosmopolitan mind of China's emperors. It was not uncommon for ‘Shangdi’ (the Emperor) to employ foreigners (Li, 1998). For example, it was the Shunzhi Emperor (顺治帝, 1638-1661) who promoted Cologne-born German Jesuit Johan Adam Schall von Bell to a Mandarin of first class; and it was the Kangxi Emperor (康熙帝, 1654-1722) who frequently summoned the Vlaanderen-born Belgian Ferdinand Verbiest (1623-1688) to the Forbidden City (紫禁城). Shunzhi and Kangxi both were keen on having the Jesuits bringing new science and technology to China, not necessary so because they felt China was desperately in need of Western technology, but because that is what vassal states were supposed to do in those days of ‘Tianxia’ (天下, The Celestial Empire or All under Heaven): the non-Chinese scholars, struck by the immense power and might of the Chinese civilization, out of humbleness and submission, were simply expected to and naturally would feel obliged to contribute to the Empire and in return were rewarded privileges and official posts *quid pro-quo*.

“It is power that makes one benevolent”; this same kind of fair-minded atmosphere of tolerance, academic freedom, and mutual dependency during the Ming Dynasty would have been difficult to achieve in prejudiced Europe, let alone for its native Jesuits to negotiate with the clerics back in Vatican City alternative world-views, if one recalls Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) who happened to spend the latter part of his life under the Inquisition's house arrest.

Thus, it was very likely the case that (my words): the Jesuits had an extraordinary good time in Asia while living under ‘Tianxia’, built some churches but also translated Chinese literature, and stood on good terms with the

Confucian mode of moral conduct and learning, in exchange for an equally curious and tolerant Chinese audience (Li, 1998, Jami, 2001).

With wave after wave of the Jesuits flocking into China, embracing the Chinese and ‘mysteriously’ converting into ‘apostles of Confucius’ (Hart, 1999), it is not difficult to understand why, in 1704, Pope Clement XI finally intervened and issued his notorious ‘*Papal bull*’, condemning all Chinese beliefs and rites *per se*. It was outrageous and plain inconceivable to the Catholic Church, “how a system of filial piety and state morality called Confucian could take the place of a proper religion, could make men, even the mass of Asia, do without religion” (Gu, 1922). Of course, the fascination with Chinese culture would never cease in Western academic circles. It could only increase.

The Germans admired Asia immensely. Goethe rejoiced: “They have another peculiarity; in China men and nature are inseparable.” Leibniz wrote that this by far most populous nation on Earth, with a highly ordered civil structure, must have achieved that population and civil structure through some identifiable means. Satirically, it may be for your amusement, Leibniz suggested that Chinese missionaries should be invited to instruct the European people (Cook and Rosemont, 1994).

The British imperialists of those days and after two Opium wars - otherwise totally convinced of their own “religion” of Anglo-Saxon capitalism and industrial superiority – nevertheless still found occasional and enough praise for their ‘conquered’. In 1922, after spending a year lecturing at Peking University, the British philosopher and mathematician Russell, despite his ludicrous criticism on the “cowardice, callousness, and voraciousness in the average Chinaman”, still found mostly words of admiration for China’s industrialism and overeager hospitality, and, naturally, the Imperial examination system (c. 605-1905) or ‘ke ju’ [科举] (Russell, 1922). This gargantuan system of totalitarian proportion yet universal meritocracy (in theory, in praxis there is abuse in any system) had, over the course of 1300 years, co-shaped Confucian China and Imperial China, and, although formally abandoned in 1905, in Russell’s time still dominated people’s minds and attitudes towards learning and career. The system, unlike the European one of those days, was theoretically blind to social background or creed of its candidates, and was solely designed to find the most intelligent and diligent individuals among the huge Chinese gene pool.

Russell’s analysis of China and its people is concluded by a prophecy, namely that the Chinese civilization alone has the power to easily supersede - economically and intellectually - all European states combined if only they adopt Western science to defend themselves against aggression but otherwise stay faithful to their own fine civilization (Russell, 1922). For those who did not believe in China’s potential ‘other’ civilization, Russell had this warning:

The Chinese demand Western science. But they do not demand the adoption of the Western philosophy of life.

If they were to adopt the Western philosophy of life, they would, as soon as they had made themselves safe against foreign aggression, embark upon aggression on their own account. (Bertrand Russel, 1922)

Unfortunately, to this day, this is exactly what half-educated Western policy-makers encourage China to become. Ignoring any information about China is not knowledge about China, with their often reckless demands for ‘The American Dream’, the ‘Rechts- und Verfassungsstaat’, ‘Democracy’, ‘Human Rights’, the Western nations of today are aiming at constructing a Middle Kingdom in their own image:

“Hey, China, You look like one of us. Look what we’ve made you!”

Chapter 8: Two successful models

Despite the evidences of the “other humanity”, the East, a civilization that went down the inductive path, ship after ship of enthusiastic but ignorant Western scholars set their sails for Asia, their eyes set on analyzing and deconstructing the hype and propaganda of ‘the exotic Other’ and proving that the East is a mere repressed, introverted, sleeping beauty, denying the existence of the East-West dichotomy, ignoring all warnings, only to discover the same old truth all over again: The East constitutes an entirely different type of humanity: it is holistic, non-analytic and spiritual – it is integration-based, and it is very capable and strong. We come back to that in a minute. But first some more facts:

Most sinologists and universal historians today more or less agree that before Xu Guangqi (徐光启, 1562-1633) published his translation of the first six books of Euclid’s Elements of Geometry in 1607, this kind of Greek/Hellenistic, analytic-deductive driven mathematics and axiomatic proof-findings had been systematically unknown to Asia (Needham, 1964; Hart, 1999; Spence, 2001). Indeed, it took China’s mathematicians roughly 250 years, until in 1851 Alexander Wylie (1815-1887) and Li Shanlan (李善兰, 1811-1882) published the second half of the translation of Euclid’s Elements of Geometry, to realize the practicability of axioms at all (Hornig Wann-Sheng, 2001)

What started off with the co-operation of Xu Guangqi and Matteo Ricci in 1607 later became the nucleus of an entirely new branch of Western scholarship – ‘The History of Science in China’. Why is that such an interesting new branch of scholarship? Well, since it was European missionaries who pro-actively entered China and taught the Chinese, not some Chinese missions to Europe, and since the Western missionaries were believed to possess the religion of truth and analytical sciences, how was it possible that an atheist, non-analytical civilization like China nevertheless had developed into an intelligent, fully-functional society that in countless fields like art, agriculture, astronomy, economics, logistic, medicine and mechanics was more advanced than its European counterparts. That is why the ‘History of Science in China’ had to be carefully reconstructed in the West in order to make sense of it all.

The Jesuits in China, as I said elsewhere before, were mostly successful simply because they did not insist on implementing the whole of euro-centric catechism on the ordinary Chinaman; on the contrary they even adapted to Confucian scholarship. However, what they reported back to Europe about the kind, good-hearted, intelligent and confident Chinaman and his unique state morality and Confucian/Daoism/Buddhism mode of conduct, often nurtured a certain dislike for the ‘second humanity’. In comparison to Mohammad’s teachings in the *Quran* - which is after all a relatively young religious canon (c. 600 AD) -, Islam is essentially dogmatic but practical orientated, thus having turned into a physical competitor, whereas the much older *I Ching* (易经, c. 1050-256 BC), *Dao De Jing* (道德经, c. 600 BC), the Buddhist sutras (佛经, c. 500 BC), or *The Analects* (论语, ca. 479-221 BC) seem to

cover deeply philosophical issues, metaphysics, difficult mathematics and a complex moral system, much of it that puts some serious challenges to some of those ambivalent wisdoms offered in the *Bible*. In other words, Christianity had found some sort of enlighten competitor:

The German philosopher Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854) was convinced that already in prehistoric times China became her own or the “other humanity”, distinct from the rest of the world, and, furthermore, that is was the only living remnant of a time before the world was divided into two different humanities (Schelling, 1842). He also branded China “un univers sans Dieu”; Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) labeled it: “an embalmed mummy wound in silk” or “corner people”, and, finally, Alain Peyrefitte (1925-1999), author of *The Collision of two civilizations*, famously called it: “l’empire immobile” (Bernie, 2005), because of its compliance and, ultimately, meekness.

Same faithful Europeans who believed in God and the scientific ways, and – sensing a lack both of religion and science in China – assumed there had been no scientific advancement in China before the European arrival. Not quite a fair observation, as we know today. It is true that before the introduction of Western sciences, there had been indeed no need for foreign axioms. But that was simply because East-Asia had cultivated its own practical driven mathematics, primarily relying on induction and analogical reasoning. In fact, this stubborn and very different “scientific” approach of the Chinese infuriated the European Imperialist ever since, culminating in the famous, almost hysterical saying by Sir Rev. Arthur Smith in his *The Chinese Characteristics* (1890), that “the Chinese mind absolutely must be algebraic, while the Western mind is arithmetical” (Smith, 1890).

Chinese Characteristics, mainly because of its style, is probably the single most outrageous book on the peculiarities of the Chinaman ever written, causing rushes of anti-Western resentment among the Chinese leading up to the Boxer Rebellion against the Western imperialists in 1899-1901. Yet, Smith simple recounted what every scientist in the field already knew: There is the integration-based East, and there is the analysis-based West, and no third mode of reasoning other than that of the inductive and deductive modes has ever been achieved by human beings. It seemed incredible, but here was Asia which excelled more in the inductive ways, while there was Europe which excelled more at the deductive ways. And that was it.

Gems of ancient Chinese inductive-driven mathematics are *The Book of Changes* [易经] written during the Zhou Dynasty (1050-256 BC, while possibly originated around 2800 BC by Fu Xi [伏羲]), the *Book of Poetry* [诗经] with pieces written around 1000 BC, the *Mo Jing* [墨经] (470-390 BC), *The Nine Chapters on the Mathematical Art* [九章算术] (c. 200 BC-179 AD) [the Nine Chapters had a great influence on the Japanese scholar Seki Takakazu who developed – during the Edo Period in 1603-1867 – another arithmetical, idiosyncratic mathematics called ‘wasan’ (和算)], the *Zhoubi Manual* [周髀算经] written during the Han period (c. 202 BC to 220 AD), the *Sea Island Manual* [海岛算经] written during the Three Kingdoms period in 263 AD, and the *Jade*

Mirror of the Four Unknowns [四元玉鉴] written in 1303 AD. Zhu Shijie [朱世杰] (1303 AD), in the tradition of the *I Ching* (易经, c. 1050-256 BC): “‘One’ is the source of all mathematics”, and *Dao De Jing* (道德经, c. 600 BC): “The Tao begets the One; the One begets the Two opposites”, summarizes (Chinese) mathematics: “All stems from the number ‘one’”. By this Zhu Shijie perfectly harmonizes Chinese mathematics with the Eastern concept of ‘oneness’, thus once more effectively summarizing the essence of most Eastern philosophy – be it the teachings of Siddhartha Buddha (563-483 BC), Vyasa of the *Mahabharata* (c. 800 BC), or the *Four Confucian Classics* (四書五經, before 221 BC).

Someone who is genuinely interested in mathematics could call all the cited works above the ‘Chinese Computation Classics’. Xu Guangqi made some attempts to integrate Western and Chinese mathematics, but mostly ended up being pragmatic about it – if a Chinese equation led to the same results as the Western one, it was there to stay, if not, it was to abandon (Engelfriet & Siu, 2001).

Chinese mathematics, which had a great influence on mathematics in Korea and Japan as well, flourished until approximately the 12th and 13th century, fell into decline after the arrival of the Jesuits and Western and their teachings about arithmetical mathematics and analytic-based science, and became almost forgotten during the 19th and 20th century (Jami et. al, 2001, Engelfriet & Siu, 2001). But that does not mean necessary that it was all ‘no good’ - on the contrary:

Zhu Shijie [朱世杰], in his *Jade Mirror* of 1303, for example teaches a diagram similar to that in Pascal’s *Traité du triangle arithmétique*, the latter of which was not published until 1665 in Europe. Why had the world waited 362 years for Pascal’s triangle when Zhu Shijie’s diagram could have done the same trick? A convincing answer to that is given in the *Study of the Fourteenth-Century Manual on Polynomial Equations* by J. Hoe:

Chinese written language enabled Chinese mathematicians to express themselves with a conciseness that is almost impossible to attain in highly-inflected natural languages, using an alphabet, such as prevailed in Europe. Thus, Chinese were able to deal with problems which in the West could not be tackled until a suitable mathematical symbolism had been developed. At the same time, this meant that the Chinese mathematicians never had the incentive to develop a fully symbolic algebraic notation, since the need for one was never as acutely felt as in Europe. (J. Hoe, 2007)

Language barriers, cultural prejudices, ignorance or pure spite? One is dread to think it’s all of it, and a lot more than that, and that is hasn’t changed much during the last 400 years. Don’t expect any great proportions of American or British citizens– even the more educated ones- ever to learn the host’s language or to know anything about the host other than the information they got from English textbooks. It is not going to happen, it is wishful thinking.

Already in 1627, Xu Guangqi [徐光启] applied scientific methods and conducted experiments – as demonstrated in the vast corpus of his works leading to his *Almanac of Agriculture* 农政全书 (1627) - on crops, sweet potatoes, and water irrigation, to name but a few (Jami, 2001). The results were impressive. In 1630, China could feed its 70 million people. Some 120 years later, when Britain was forced to think scientifically about how to improve its agriculture in order to feed its “overpopulation” of some 5,7 million, China already nurtured a nation of roughly 200 million.

Similar far ahead of its time, the *Chinese Traditional Calendar* by Guo Shoujing (郭守敬 1231-1316) which is based on the synodic month (time taken by the moon to make a complete circle around the earth) on which later the agrarian *Twenty-Four Fortnightly Periods* (节气 Jie Qi) were based, had been invented at least 300 years before the Gregorian calendar (which is in effect a solar calendar) in Europe (Hashimoto, 2001)

Talking more about sciences, Liu Hui [刘徽] in his *Sea Island Manual* (海岛算经, c. 263 AD) measured the sun’s height by the lengths of a shadow cast on an upright rod. By comparing geographical distances and spaces, the Chinese scholars employed their own mechanical, scientific methods that relied on empirical proofs devised by their ancestors, rather than axiomatic proofs preferred by the ancient Greeks and devised by their ancestors (Jami, 2001). As a rule, in traditional Chinese mathematics, a geometric problem was almost universally converted into an algebraic problem, quite different from the geometrical approach let’s say in Euclid’s *Elements*.

Surprisingly, today traditional Chinese mathematics like mechanical proofs or ‘Wu Wenjun’s method’ experience a revival in Computational Sciences, just as Chinese medicine, Chinese education and Chinese politics do in the other respective fields; all these disciplines are now striving again for recognition in world science.

To sum up, only after the West, culturally and scientifically, “invaded” the Eastern hemisphere, did mathematics in China become the universally axiomatic-deductive driven vehicle it is today. But Western invasion was not the precursor for sciences in China. Science had been in Asia before, if only in a different fashion and unique manner (Needham, 1956; Jami, 2001).

Fortunately, the Western fabricated fairy-tale of former Eastern ‘backwardness’ and Western ‘glory’ in this century now lies tattered and wrenched. In reality, Eastern and Western knowledge is fairly balanced and complementary, and always has been :

As Francis Bacon and James Clerk Maxwell (1831-1879, mathematician and theoretical physicist) have sufficiently explained, ideally, the most sincere science is done today when *both* the *inductive* and the *deductive* methods find their due application. In some disciplines we prefer the inductive way – the arts; in many we tend to

sway from side to side, like in sociology, archeology, psychology, philosophy – the humanities; in others we prefer the deductive way, like in mathematics, physics, biology, chemistry – the classical sciences, but ideally, induction and deduction should be used more balanced.

Maxwell's equations are a good example of a successful synthesis: he carefully applied first the deductive methods in proving several equations in seemingly separated fields of research, then the inductive method to demonstrate that electricity, magnetism, and even light are all manifestations of the same phenomenon: the electromagnetic field. It is like seeing each tree, and then the whole forest, but never both quite at the same time. This lesson, unfortunately, describes an 'ideal' solution of problem solving by picking up a single successful case out of a million yet undecided ones.

A discovery of revolutionary proportions in the evolution of culture: an entire civilization, the East, goes down a more induction-based path, arriving at universals; while another civilization, the West, goes down the exact opposite, a more deduction-based path, arriving at particulars? If that is what indeed happened, it would constitute a discovery of great consequences; it would mean that Western superior history has been ideologically and methodically biased, if not inherently flawed, throughout the ages:

The academic discipline of history is inevitably ideological in essence. Regardless of what might be the case with individual historical events, historical narration is always the result of a series of selective choices, so that the influence of the historian's standpoint is inescapable. (Toshio Kuroda, 1990)

Universal history, as explained all over this book, has at least two angles of view. As Needham (1951), G. E. R. Lloyd (1996), J. Spence (2001) (all three were married to Chinese women, if you must know) demonstrated to Western audiences, China's contributions to humankind in traditional mathematics, medicine, statecraft, and agriculture developed since quite remote times before the First Emperor Qin's unification of China up to the Song (宋 960-1127-1279) and Yuan Dynasty (元 1271-1368) (Wu, 2007). In the course of just over one publication series *Science and Civilization in China* (1954-2000), European scholarship was to cry out loud at the sensational, if not horrifying news that Europeans own their paper money, matches, umbrellas, playing cards and whisky all to some blueprints of an unfamiliar Chinese mastermind (Temple, 2007). Unsurprisingly, the Chinese Communist Party, Chinese Ministry of Education, readily adopted Needham's thesis that so more often than not applauds, eulogizes and praises those good old days *When Asia was the World* (Gordon, 2007), a superstition that rarely makes sense today to anyone except some Western sinologist and orientalist.

In addition, and to the embarrassment of serious scholarship, the 'History of Sciences in China' became the hobbyhorse for tens of thousands of amateur scholars, exchange students, tourists and backpackers from around the world, taking up anything European or American and tracing it back to some Asian roots of origin. Today,

newspapers, computers, soccer, even German sauerkraut and sausages, Italian pasta and pizza, Reggae and Bob Marley have their firmly established Chinese progenitors (the latter of whom there are Vincent and Patricia Chin of Randy's Records in Jamaica, if you insist on knowing).

Yet, whatever this new wave of 21st century 'Eastern enlightenment to the West', often mixed with institutionalized overstatement and euphemism in sensation-seeking media or some individuals' fancies may bring, even the most frivolous ambition to remedy the past failures of the Asian for the glory of her future cannot cover the fact, as Needham, Jami, Engelfriet, Lloyd, and Li described it, that China in particular had not developed or not sufficiently developed anything in the way of science and technology that could compete with the – rather lucky than good - Western Imperialist's model, which in turn attested the Chinese being a people of 'arrested development' (Gu, 1922). I said "rather lucky than good", because some scholars, by bending history to the point of breaking, want us to believe that "evil" Western dominance in Asia can only be explained by the lucky insensitive of scientific discoveries like rifles and cannons (Chirot, 1991) surpassing the firecrackers made of China's gunpowder. Others, like Jant Aby-Lughod (1989) for example, point to the 'moment of China's political weakness' during the fall of the Mongols in the 13th century and coined the phrase 'bad luck for Asia', which was "exploited by the Europeans who lacked any singularly innovative entrepreneurial scientific, or otherwise worthwhile advantages, except perhaps an exceptionally nasty tendency to conduct their large-scale trade as piracy" (Aby-Lughod, 1989).

Nevertheless and despite Western dominance, the Chinese civilization had its advantages. Its strong tradition of learning, memorization, with translation and integration of foreign thoughts reaching back to the early Buddhist monks during the Six Dynasties (222-589 AD), there is a remarkable consistency that ultimately proves a point:

It is important you should remember, that this nation of children, who live a life of the heart, [...] have yet the power of mind and rationality [...] which has enabled them to deal with the complex and difficult problems of social life, government and civilization with a success which, I will venture to say here, the ancient and modern nations of Europe have not been able to attain. (Gu Hongming, 1922)

I could go on, but rather propose this midway conclusion. It might strike some Europeans as outright offensive, but the truth is that they are not alone claiming the title of the fittest in 'surviving' history. To put it into historical perspective: the Chinese Empire was united in 221 BC under the Qin Emperor (秦), some 1,997 years before Jefferson drafted the Declaration of Independence in 1776 AD. India's sense of unity, ethnic diversity and, yes, democratic roots too grew out of necessity because of its 'composite religious culture' some 2500 years ago. The Europeans, till to this date, struggle even with a constitutional-ish treaty.

Chapter 9: **Two incommensurable realities**

Discussing the East-West dichotomy in cultural terms became popular again in social science in the 80's and 90's, with the revival of the ideas of Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), Auguste Comte (1798-1857), Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) and Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975). The goal of international scholarship was nothing less spectacular than to categorize all the world's cultures, to evaluate them, to dissect them, to discover and reveal patterns, and to make predictions about when they peak, when the struggle, and when they inevitably fall (Kennedy, 1987; CCTV, 2006).

The father of sociology, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406 AD), wrote this:

This should be understood. It shows that the goal of civilization is sedentary culture and luxury. When civilization reaches that goal, it turns toward corruption and starts being senile, as happens in the natural life of living beings. (Ibn Khaldun, 1377)

Treating cultures as living beings has been the scientific trend ever since Khaldun. Reading Western sociology today, we now have plenty of exciting – if not incredible - choices of a culture's 'rise and fall':

- * “youth, growth, maturation and decline” (Spengler, 1917) ;
- * civilizations taking turns or going in circles (Ji, 2006);
- * a masculine West vs. a feminine East (Garrison, 2000);
- * nations ‘marrying and divorcing’ each other (Griffiths, 1982);
- * countries collecting and redistributing credits for scientific discoveries among them in a ‘Grand Titration’ (Needham, 2004);
- * an insurmountable ‘Great Divide’ (Horton and Finnegan, 1973);
- * a psychic unity, a secularization (Berger, 1966, 1974);
- * a de-secularization (Berger, 1999);
- * a synthesis;
- * a hybrid world;
- * a flat world (Friedmann, 1962, 1990, 2006);
- * globalization, many globalizations (Berger and Huntington, 1974);
- * brutal and straightforward neo-Darwinism (Heinsohn, 2003);
- * or just plenty of Empire (Hardt and Negri, 2001) - produced by one ‘kind’ of corporate man - preferably one of Aryan descendant (Gellner, 1979).

This 20th century “cultural heat” (Ji, 2006) that is reaping its social theories by the bushels is well

documented, and it is impossible to discuss them all.

What all theories have in common, however, and what has not changed this 21st century, as it has never been seriously challenged for the last two millennia, is a universe of facts from philosophy, politics and now evolutionary biology, social and linguistic anthropology that seem to suggest that the history of civilization - and thus all human identity - is built on and around the *fundamental differences* and interaction among and between groups, populations and cultures, and that the one difference and the one interaction that matter the most are those of the *two great cultural systems*: the *West* and its *Other*.

Perhaps the most striking phenomenon in Cultural Studies today is the revival of Max Weber's 'ideal types of cultures' that do facilitate progress and those that do not. Toynbee loved those cultural league tables, too. A new blame-game set in to find the latest 'sick-men-of-Europe', the next 'youth bulge' (Goldstone, 1991; Fuller, 1995; Heinsohn, 2003), 'another failed (Arab) state', a 'left behind', an 'axis's of evil', an 'empire in decline', the Chinese Century (Shenkar, 2004), the *New Asian Hemisphere* (Mahbubani, 2008), the 'yellow peril', or just another victim for the 'War on Terror'.

Sensationalist literature about it is abundant: In the West we read Samuel P. Huntington (1993, 2000, 2004), Francis Fukuyama (1992), Jared Diamond (2003, 2006), Milton Friedman (1962, 1990, 2006), and Juergen Habermas (1996, 2003, 2006). In the East we have Ji Xianlin [季羡林] (2006), Gu Zhengkun [辜正坤] (2003), Tu Weiming [杜维明] (2000, 2003), and Kishore Mahbubani (2008), to name but a few important contributors.

According to Weber (1864-1920), Western standards, institutions of law, science, education and economics reflect Western analysis-based rationalism and this may explain why the West got rich and technologically advanced before the East did (Weber, 2001). That underlying promise proved to be believable. Today, virtually every piece of scientific and economical history has been tried on the Eastern people to demonstrate the - seemingly irrefutable - fact that the West was and (still) is the single most important and the only leading creative force of humankind. In fact, the only way for a person of Hindu, Arab or Chinese background to get some personal integrity in this world was to become westernized, study in Western universities, or work for a Western international cooperation. The East it seemed was never in the position to ask for anything, except for trouble.

Unfortunately, Mr. Weber could not read Japanese, Chinese, Hindi, Urdu, Arabic, Korean, Thai nor any other Eastern language. In fact, arguably the world greatest orientalist – he had never been to the orient. We could say then, that he was a German rationalist, in the time when Germany used to be a great power (c. 1871-1918). In those old days leading up to two devastating world-wars, it was entirely sufficient for a German rationalist (and sociologist, that's what they call Mr. Weber) of his affluence, to explain the mechanics of world history not by empirical investigation or observation, but – just like the other part-time sinophobic Germans Kant (1724-1804),

Schlegel (1772-1829), Schelling (1775-1854) and Herder (1744-1803) before him - by miraculous, rational enquiry from within his closet.

For the same reason, if you had given Mr. Weber a fictional race, lets say the 'smurfs', undoubtedly he would have woven a perfect and sound argument, why the 'smurfs' did not build a financial empire and got rich, as the protestants in Europe so splendidly did, based on the sole and simple reason that 'smurfs' are no protestants. This, of course, is a tautology of epic proportions (e. g. smurfs or not-smurfs are no protestants), and, consequently, as a proposition true under any possible valuation while at the same time utterly meaningless for achieving knowledge about the empirical world. For that reason, Weber's theory in sociology, like Freud in psychology or Marx in economics, has come out of favor; this not necessary so solely on grounds that his work is inherently non-scientific, but more so because his dialogue with other cultures is really a *self-serving, tedious monologue*. He, like so many other orientalist of his time, tells stories and plays with the imaginations of his European audiences, yet has never seen nor experienced anyone unlike them.

Another, maybe more elegant, explanation of Western historical dominance over world affairs was given by the renowned Edward Said (1935-2003), founder of 'post-colonial theory' in his masterpiece *Orientalism* (1978) and – independently – by Linda Hutcheon in *The Politics of Post-Modernism* (1989). Post-colonial theory essentially says that Orientalism, the study of Eastern cultures, religions and languages, is the creation ('brain-child' is the term of fashion, I believe) of Western scholars. Western scholars had written Asia's history from a perspective of European-centred norms, just like the Greeks fashioned the Persians in their way, thereby only intensifying the exotic 'otherness' of the Eastern hemisphere. Said and Hutcheon both argue, that first 'post-colonial' and then 'post-modernist' theories both are Western concepts. Second, that they are syntheses of bourgeois rationalism of the European Enlightenment as thesis on the one hand, and modernism as the anti-thesis on the other.

Bourgeois rationalism, modernism and post-modernism to be sure could be categorized as age of reasoning (17th -18th century), age of totalities (19th – beginning 20th century), and age of uncertainty (mid 20th century). As the two above mentioned authors would agree then, the East did not experience any of these categorizations, just as the West did not experience a Bolsheviks Revolution (1918), Communism (1918-1989), the Chinese Revolution (1926-1949), the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), nor the Opening-up-era under Deng Xiaoping (1979-1997).

As a consequence, it seems persuasive to me that neither hemisphere necessarily has to experience the other hemisphere's history in order to proceed with its own. There is a *philosophical misconception* in the writings of many Western scholars that seems to suggest that China (or India) will never catch up, because they only recently reached an early industrial age and missed out the (Western) Enlightenment.

If human evolution were, like most Western scholars would have it, essentially a one-way causal process (like climbing a ladder), why did the Romans or Greeks on their way to become a proper civilization never produced Confucius, Mencius, the Tang Dynasty, the *Rgveda*, the *Brahmanas* or the *Mahabharata*? Surely, if we take the simple metaphor of history as a life-tree, similar to Haeckel's '*Tree of Life*' (1897) in biology, in its earliest stage it could well have branched into two separate directions, with no subsequent coalescence possible (Haeckel, 2004). One branch could have developed into the Western hemisphere and holds the history of a more deduction-based manner, causality and rationality. The other branch could have developed into the Eastern hemisphere and holds the history of a more induction-based manner, inter-connectedness and universality. But it would still be 'one' history-tree, or maybe two different trees albeit not too far apart. So, what makes so many Western sensationalists think that these trees or branches could possibly 'crash' - as in *Crash of Civilizations* (Huntington, 1993)? Isn't it more reasonable to think that branches or sub-branches of history may die off, wither, break, become lost or forgotten rather than 'to clash'? Surely, if the militant West wishes a *clash* (of civilization), a *clash* it will be, albeit an uninspiring, unimaginative, and utterly useless one. This so, because the Western hemisphere still does not wholly appreciate the grand alternative and worthy goal of engaging the East based on mutual respect and towards an "inclusive approach". Instead, the West focuses on the particular leaves and twigs of history, forges false unions of this and that by combining superficial Eastern similarities with common Western terminologies, calling the entire *tree of history itself a product of Western scholarship* and no other:

Whether the telos which was inborn in European humanity at the birth of Greek philosophy [...] is merely one among many other civilizations and histories, or whether Greek humanity was not rather the first breakthrough to what is essential to humanity as such. (Edmund Husserl, 1970)

The receptive, integration-based East has learned to appreciate the Western branch of knowledge for its very different views on many things. Yet, in turn it has been exploited, colonized, and humiliated by the West:

The crux of the whole question affecting the Powers of the Western nations in the Far East lies in the appreciation of the true inwardness of the Oriental mind.

(Alexis Krausse, 1900)

Isn't it important - in any relationship -, that both sides learn from each other, respect each other? If not, Goethe had this warning – for those who cared to listen (Morgan, 1958):

The Philistine not only ignores all conditions of life which are not his own but he also demands that the rest of mankind should fashion its mode of existence after his own. (Johann W. Goethe)

Regrettably, it is persistently this philistine element of her soul that dominates Europe's actions. As a result, it is not unusual to meet a Western expert in the streets of Shanghai or Beijing who has never heard of Si Maqian (司马迁), Xu Guangqi (徐光启), Lu Xun (鲁迅), Hushi (胡适), Ji Xianlin (季羡林) or Guo Morou (郭沫若). Yet, if asked for an opinion on Chinese language and culture, his chest will swell and - without ever having made the slightest progress in learning but 100 Chinese characters – he will air his expert opinion that his own sad experience of the impossibility of mastering those 65,000 Chinese ideographs truly is another historical proof that the ultimate cause of Chinese backwardness in the sciences is their very 'chinese-ness' itself. China, Japan, and India and all their peripheries are seen as the receiving end of history; they receive more and (inherently) give less (Krausse, 1900; Husserl, 1970; Pyle, 2007).

Western nations seek a global civilization, which they believe is an *extension of their own*; while the Eastern nations, still cherishing their traditional cultures, will feel the 'rage of the Western destabilizers', if they do not comply with Western aggression:

"Chinese society bears a function of 'interior self-stability', while the European society possesses an 'interiorly-installed unstable factor'" (Needham, 1964).

Accordingly, Western nations act as if they 'own' the globe, history, and all material objects. As soon as Asian nationals lay hands on any matters material or any theories about matters material, that very action is deemed a service to 'westernization, as if there was a Western patent on matter and modernity. There are Western tourists in Singapore, Shanghai, Yokohama, who genuinely believe that every house, bank, pair of high-heels, traffic lights, newspapers, computers, trains or automobiles are a genuine extension of Western civilization.

Young Anglo-saxon visitors are especially quick to remind the Asians that every English-language billboard marks Anglo-Saxon cultural territory. The fact that their own language is a 500+ AD branch of the Germanic language family; with those German tribes, the Angles and the Saxons, being the immediate ancestors - few of them learn in school anymore.

We may forgive those clueless, young Asia-bashers. But for the sake of dignity and cultural diversity, they should be properly educated that the chief end of Asian man is not to glorify the Anglo-Saxon way of life, or any other Western model. A global language, exchange and economy is a good thing, but 'globalization' as the mediator between East & West will not make East into West, nor West into East. Buddhism has not made China an India, and capitalism has not made Japan an America. To annihilate 'cultural diversification', accumulated in thousands of years or more, might not be as easy after all, not even in an American corporate dream. Isn't a 'common sensibility' preferable to all this American talk about global culture and values (Zhao, 2005)? How about 'All under heaven' (天下, tianxia) or 'harmoniousness society' (和谐社会, hexie shehui) – are those not more honest

guarantors for mutual respect and dignity among civilizations?

As an example of East and West talking cross purpose, the memorable dialogue between Albert Einstein and Rabindranath Tagore on July 14, 1930 shows, quite nicely I think, Einstein's limits to fully appreciate what Tagore wants to communicate, namely that the Western notion of causality has its limits. Consequently, Einstein, quite diplomatically, dismisses Eastern mysticism as un-scientific and, this it is implied, rather unhelpful:

Tagore: "I was discussing with Dr. Mendel today the new mathematical discoveries which tell us that in the realm of infinitesimal atoms chance has its play; the drama of existence is not absolutely predestined in character."

Einstein: "The facts that make science tend toward this view do not say good-bye to causality."

Tagore: "Maybe not, yet it appears that the idea of causality is not in the elements, but that some other force builds up with them an organized universe." [...]

Einstein: "I believe that whatever we do or live for has its causality; it is good however, that we cannot see through it." (Tagore, 1931)

One can see from this "whatever" Einstein "cannot see through", nevertheless in his Western view it must be linear, causally related. Einstein a priori rules out – as it seems fit for any proper scientist – any alternative to Western-style causality. It also seems out of the question for Einstein and the culture he represents to think that there is any concept - let alone that of an 'ancient Oriental wizard' (Kawabata, 1969) - other than a scientific, rational Western one. Kipling's "East is East, and West is West, and never the two shall meet" comes to mind (Kipling, 1999).

What would have happened if Tagore had brought up the 'continuum cycle of 'samsara', 'non-violence', 'free will', 'karma', the function of impermanent, unsatisfactory, empty and lacking-a-self 'dharma's', or just 'good poetry'? Surely, there must be more wisdom than Western science in this world:

Perhaps in return for conquest, arrogance and spoliation, India will teach us the tolerance and gentleness of the mature mind, the quiet content of the unacquisitive soul, the calm of the understanding spirit, and a unifying, a pacifying love for all living things. (Will Durant, 1930)

Land of religions, cradle of human race, birthplace of human speech, grandmother of legend, great grandmother of tradition. The land that all men desire to see and having seen once even by a glimpse, would not give that glimpse for the shows of the rest of the globe combined. (Mark Twain, 1897)

In my understanding, the two global hemispheres experienced a different history, and this made them who they

are today. What did the existentialists teach us about identity? Isn't it the case that the beginning of human history determined what we are, but our historical experience determines who we are? Shouldn't we all agree that what we are a – more or less identical – human people. However, thousands of years of unique history made us who we are: Chinese, Indians, Japanese, Germans, French, British etc., and, eventually, we shaped the East and the West.

I will not ditch on each and every leave or twig and say that any particular culture should be preserved, nor will I give myself into the illusion that everything can be preserved. Having said this, however, the smallest leaves and twigs will bend and break when the weather becomes harsh, and wither when the tree is not well nurtured. If our criteria were 'longevity', however, we would be safest to bet on the two great branches of world history: the East and the West.

To conclude, the argument that East and West look at the same history albeit from different angles is to be refuted: History is not localized, nor is it something hung out to be looked at. Quite the contrary, we have every reason to believe that the two hemispheres not only interpret each other's history differently, but irreversible experience their very own history, and that the only way to experience one's own history differently from the others or misinterpret the others' differently, is an exclusive set of cognitive ability – the East is *more* inductive while the West is *more* deductive.

Chapter 10: **The theory of power and to whom it belongs**

Western analytical-based societies, with their emphasis on achieving “useful” knowledge, became masters and possessors of nature, with the perspective of active domination over other civilizations.

While in the integration-based societies knowledge came from studying the classics, the wise, the kings of old, the analysis-based West started to categorize and deconstruct nature and all things. Periodism, for example, is characteristically related to Western rationalism, as opposed to non-event related dynasties named after Chinese emperors for example, so is categorization as a method to acquire new knowledge ad infinitum. Western societies dress themselves in the mantle of knowledge, and knowledge is linked to power, which has been the very source of European predominance:

We should admit... that power produces knowledge... that power and knowledge directly imply one another... that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge.

(Michel Foucault, 1977)

The concept of power in the integration-based East however is sheer might in numbers, uniformity and thus consistency. This spiritual ‘moral power’ drove out the Imperialists in the first half of the 20th century:

The truest test of civilization, culture and dignity is character, not clothing. (Mahatma Gandhi)

To sum up, Western power in my taxonomy is related to analytically-based deductive knowledge whereas Eastern power is related to integration-based inductive knowledge. The former has the historical function of a dangerous, yet creative force; the latter has the historical function of a tranquil, yet moral force.

Chapter 11: The problem of standard

钱宾四 wrote in his 中国思想史(1991): “中国文化过去最伟大的贡献, 在于对 ‘天 ‘ ’ 人 ‘关系的研究 “ . If you cannot understand what I just wrote that means you probably do not understand Chinese. It says: “Among all those past contributions of Chinese culture (to mankind), the study of the relation between ‘heaven’ and ‘man’ is the grandest” (Qian, 1991/1998).

Without knowing Chinese, it is, I would argue, difficult to read, listen and understand the Chinese people. Sadly, not knowing Chinese is the rule among Western commentators on the East-West dichotomy: the political thinkers Montesquieu (1689-1755), and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832); the great writers Denis Diderot (1713-1784) and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832); the economist and moral philosopher Adam Smith (1723-1790); the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-); and the three great ‘formakers’ in cultural studies Francis Bacon (1561-1626, he initiated the scientific revolution), Max Weber (1864-1920, he founded the modern study of sociology), and Karl Marx (1818-1883, the father of communism and dialectic materialism). Especially in philosophy, we have the - verifiably – highly gifted Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), Friedrich W. S. Schelling (1775-1854), Georg Wilhelm F. Hegel (1770-1831), Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) – all of them who wrote passionately on the Confucian or Buddhist canon, categorized the world’s people, and judged upon their cultural modes.

Now, of all the persons listed above, to my knowledge none of them had ever mastered Classical Chinese or Sanskrit, nor learned any other Asiatic language in a lifetime.

But then, why should they? The standard of Western knowledge is Western civilization and, recently, the English language, and against that standard all other cultures are measured and judged upon. The West, not man, it seems, is the measure of all things:

There is something unique here in Europe that is recognized in us by all other human groups, too, something that [...] becomes a motive for them to Europeanize themselves even in their unbroken will to spiritual self-preservation, whereas we, if we understand ourselves properly, would never Indianize ourselves, for example. (Edmund Husserl, 1935)

It is clear to all Chinese that Western culture is the root of wealth, success, development and political survival – it is the essence of modernity. (Francesco Sisci, 2008)

This air of condescension is reflected in Western education systems. It is still perfectly conceivable, in the 21st century, to meet a German, French, Italian, American visiting scholar on the streets of Delhi or Shanghai, who has

never heard about Rammohan Roy, Sri Autobindo, Ramakrishna Paramahansa, Si Maqian, Hu Shi, Liang Qichao, or Lu Xun. Outside Asia the situation is truly hopeless, with the average American Joe or European Karl not being able to name a single living Chinese person.

The histories of China, Japan, and India were not even mentioned (before 2008) in the syllabus of Germany's compulsory secondary school curriculum. This void of general (Asian) knowledge extends to grand literature works such as *The Journey to the West*, *Outlaws of the Marsh*, the *Puranas* or the *Ramayana*.

Even to this day, nine out of ten university professors of Chinese or Sanskrit/Hindi Studies in Europe are not able to write or communicate fluently in those languages, let alone to a level worthy of the highest intellectual standard, and even have to employ Chinese or Indian translators or assistants to help their 'white masters' carefully dissecting those foreign texts as if they were insects.

Are Europeans really that ignorant? Of course, they are not. Far from it, in fact, they are really busy in all intellectual departments in keeping what they have, and maybe learning a bit more about finance, IT, and American popular culture. What they don't have is spare time and human resources to master Eastern cultures and languages.

Only so much time and energy can be devoted to the pursuit of knowledge of other cultures without other aspects of our own culture suffering. In 1964 Germany proudly produced 1,357,000 children; in 2006 it was a mere 676,000 – out of which 28-30% were of non-German nationality (destasis, 2006) Therefore, it will be an unachievable task for Germany to maintain its own culture, let alone learning a lot more new things. Take the Swedish culture, a people of merely 8 millions (of whom 20% are foreigners, but this aside). In order to maintain Swedish history and knowledge, China could send a mere 0,5 % of its population to do the job. On the other hand if the entire Swedish population tried to maintain Chinese history and knowledge, they would not only discontinue the Swedish cause, but would also venture no further than to preserve a tiny 0,5 % of the Chinese civilization. It is therefore self-evident, which countries have greater capacity for cultural preservation.

Of all the cultures that have disappeared from this world, to my knowledge, not a single farewell letter or suicide note has ever been unearthed. It must be a pain-less, gradual, almost unnoticed just process. Some of the Goths, the East Germanic tribes who disappeared slowly after the 6th century, must have felt that their cities had too many foreigners; that their daughters preferred to marry outsiders, that their sons had to learn a foreign language, that they consumed more and more goods that they themselves did not produce; that its few survivors suddenly felt the desire to belong to something greater than their own narrow turf.

In this 21st century of voyeurism and mass media though, we may want to hear and watch some cultures die. In drawing an analogy to Ms. Kübler-Ross's celebrated 'five stages of grief' (Kübler-Ross, 1969) – denial, anger,

bargaining, depression, acceptance - certain European nations could be considered no longer in 'denial' but are already experiencing the next stage of their looming exodus, that of 'anger'.

Contrary to the Confucian laws of good manner or Indian tolerance and gentleness, Western media, especially the German, French and British ones – in the name of the European rest-monopoly on freedom, democracy and human-rights, – leave out no opportunity to shamelessly lecture China on human rights, degrade Islam, satirize India, wet-nurses the Persians (Iran), and make a mockery of all ambitions Russian – whatever floats the European boat.

This helplessness of a dying creed pointing fingers – I have not seen in India, China or the U.S.A. lately. On the contrary, these great and promising powers are optimistic and ambitious about their future. This is especially true in 2008 Olympic China, that has the world's attention: “更高, 更快, 更强 (Higher, faster, stronger, the Olympic Motto)”. In 1978, Chairman Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) proudly announced: “To get rich is glorious!”. This has been the nitty-gritty of a 30-year period of unprecedented of wealth growth (>10% of GDP) in the history of humankind (Khanna, 2008; Kim, 2006). “They undergo compulsory Maoism courses but fantasize of little but money.” (Aiyar, 2008). An American teacher in Beijing once wrote in her web-diary about Chinese students: “The think their country is doing so incredibly well and it can only get better... and they are always happy, happy, happy.” They love their country, and they embrace life. They also have plenty and great problems, they know it, but they would – as all great powers do – rather continue to be great and engage with other great nations, and not to waste too much time with the negative, nagging and left-behind former great nations, and certainly not with some jealously barking – but politically irrelevant - European demagogues.

The European nation states' diminishing roles in world politics, their declining populations (Heinsohn, 2004), the brain drain (*timeEurope*, 2004/01), and their reluctance to learn from other cultures (Phelps, 2007), are all irreversible and accelerated year by the year. Even the hope for a suffering in fragmentary unity, I am talking about the hope for a 'United States of Europe' (Reid, 2004), proved short-sighted, when first a European constitution was ruled out, and finally a European Treaty was rejected twice in 2005 by France and the Netherlands, and in 2008 by Ireland. Furthermore, in case of a referendum in Britain, 89% of the public would fervently vote against the “damn Treaty” (BBC, 2008/02). A great piece of advice will be needed to steer the European boat through these difficult times. I have one: “Not to live in living is to endure. Not to die in dying is to live on” (Kumarajiva, 2008).

What then is the problem with Europe? Why don't they unify, become 'one'? I will argue, that in 2500 years of its history, there has never been the concept of 'oneness', and 'harmoniousness' in the European collective mind. Goethe said: “There are two peaceful powers in this world: Right and Tact” (Goethe, 1833). And Gu Hongming noticed: “希伯来人的文明宗教教导欧洲人正义的知识, 但没有教导礼法. (The Religion in the civilization of the Hebrew people taught the people in Europe the knowledge of Right, but it did not teach Tact (Gu, 1922). The

Greeks knew about *Tact* and taught the Romans. The Romans tried to teach the Germanic tribes *Tact* and *Right*, but the Germanic tribes could only understand *Right*, not *Tact*. Thus, the emperors of the Holy Roman Empire (962-1806), from the King of the Franks Charlemagne (747-814) to Francis II (1768-1835), later Emperor of Austria, did not know how to rule *tactfully*, and their subjects did not know how to submit *tactfully*. About that same Empire, Voltaire used to muse “it was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire.” For a start, despite the name, it did never include Rome. Then, observe at all those divided territories, quarreling tribes and countless families that “live scattered and apart, surrounding their dwellings with open space” (Tacitus, 1996), the Franken, the Dutch, the Swiss, today’s Czech, Flemish, Polish with no lingua franca, the opposition of Prussia and Austria, the Church. And what did the righteous Napoleon do? He did what he knew was *Right*, he ran them all over again, thereby diffused and divided the already fragmented; but Napoleon did not know how to unite, rule or teach them *Tact* either.

The Chinese, on the other hand, knew only little about *Right*, but a lot more about *Tact*. Laozi said:

故大邦以下小邦，则取小邦；小邦以下大邦，则取大邦。故或下以取，或下而取。大邦不过欲兼畜人，小邦不过欲入事人。夫两者各得所欲，大者宜为下。

When a large country submits to a small country, it will adopt the small country. When a small country submits to a large country, it will be adopted by the large country. The one submits and adopts, the other submits and is adopted. It is in the interest of a large country to unite and gain service, and in the interest of a small country to unite and gain patronage. If both would serve their interests, both must submit. (Laozi, 61).

Thus, there is a tactful bond between the small states imitating the large: *Submission is a means of union*. If you ask any of the fragmented twenty-seven nation states of Europe today about their European Union, each of them wants to defend their individual *Right*, but none of them has *Tact* enough to submit to the greater cause.

The “fragmentary view” on the world has the greatest prominence in the deductive West, namely in the categorization of the people of the world and their regions, followed by a rigorous system of classification (Sen, 2006). Tibet is classified as Tibet, and its people as Tibetan, not part of China and the Chinese people (*TheEconomist*, 2007/02). The one-party political systems of Russia, Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar, Iran, and China are outrageous human conditions, if not utterly revolting to the analytical Western intellect, and a security risk to Western hegemony (Barnett, 2004).

With regards to China, Japan, Korea, Thailand, Vietnam etc. the mere thought about ‘Asian values’, their archaic and outmoded forms of politeness, filial piety, rotten-spoiled ‘little emperors’, submissive doll-like women, shyness in adult men, rote-learning, collectivism, the tendency for authoritarian rule etc.... all this exerts a specific revulsion in the Western psyche. This revulsion is so pervasive and continuous in manner that I do not dare to

speak out the irreversible and dangerous course of history that is looming over Asian civilization in case Europe (and America) cannot find itself at peace with the new, Asia-centric world-order. During the Cold War, the socialist Guy Mollet is believed to have said:

The Communists are not of the left but of the East. (Guy Mollet, 1905-1975)

That statement is based on facts. Far into the 1970's, no communist party in Western Europe or the United States held any considerable mandates. Apart from France, Italy, and of course Finland, communism was virtually absent in Western politics, except, of course, as the bogeyman. I cannot discuss the reasons here why collectivism, authoritarian rule, the spiritualization of materialism, socialism and totalitarian concepts so easily caught fire in the East, and why Stalin, Mao, Kim Yong-Il, and, yes, Hitler too, are still considered 'great leaders' among Asian nationals and admirers. They will probably always be. What I will discuss, on the other hand, is how history is now repeating itself.

The 'sell off' (or labeling) that took place in Western Europe with regard to communism as an ugly Eastern proposition, that same 'sell off' (or labeling) is now taking place in Western Europe and the United States with regard to 'harmoniousness' as an ugly Eastern proposition. Someone might want to go as far as to say:

"The 'harmonizers' are not of the liberal-democrats but of the East".

This is what Amartya Kumar Sen, the 1998 Nobel Laureate in Economics, has to say about the two civilization modes and their views:

There are two ways of thinking of the history of civilization in the world. One is to pursue the story in an inclusive form, paying attention to the divisions as well as the interdependence involved, possibly varying over time, between the manifestations of civilization in different parts of the world. This I shall call the 'inclusive approach'.

The other, which I shall call the 'fragmentary approach', segregates the beliefs and practices of different regions separately, paying attention to the interdependences between them as an after thought (when any attention is paid to them at all). (Amartya Kumar Sen, 2006)

The two ways of thinking in the history of civilizations are reflected in humankind's approach towards 'communism' and now towards 'harmoniousness'. The East is pursuing the story in an inclusive form; the West segregates the beliefs of different regions separately. The West does not identify itself with the "inclusive approach" and right now is ejecting the 'harmonizers', like the 'communists' before them, out of the Western ideological hemisphere.

Indeed, after all the recent pre-emptive strikes on terrorists and failed states, the irreversible process of ‘westernization’ and ‘globalization’, the tiresome break with each and every civic code of mutual respect and non-interference in any nation’s internal affairs, and the desire to conquer nature and, if necessary, the traditional people and tribes that made a pact with nature – how can we not say that the deductive West is *rejecting thoroughly*, entirely the inductive Eastern notion of ‘harmoniousness’?

With those statements above like “the West is rejecting ‘harmoniousness’”, of course, it seems we are committing another simple generalization. Yet, like with all abstracts that seem simple – they are actually very complex: If we study the histories of the inductive East and the deductive West, and if we understand that the one went down the integration-based path while the other the analytical-based path, we will come to understand that ‘harmoniousness’, just like any other mental concept like ‘democracy’, must be understood in the “respective Western context” or in the “respective Eastern context”.

The abstract concepts of ‘harmoniousness’ or ‘democracy’ behave non-relative precisely in their “respective Western context” and in their “respective Eastern context”, and behave relative only in itself. Here I will give an example about the so-called ‘*Golden Rule*’ in ethics, also called the ‘*ethic of reciprocity*’, which is supposedly at the root of the Western position on human rights. In Luke 6;27-31 Jesus said: “Do for others just what you want them to do for you. If you really do that, you may just find that your enemy will become your friend.” The Golden Rule from *The Bible* is unambiguous, I think, about its intention: make enemies friends (what happens if applied to friends, will they become enemies?) for one’s own personal advantage.

Another use of the Golden Rule from *The Bible* is to warn someone about the pain and punishment that comes along with breaking the Golden Rule, because once you break the Rule, you cannot rule out that someone else is breaking it on you. After all, who wants to be accused, beaten, and crucified? Despite all the individualist, very moving, and almost selfish touch of the biblical Golden Rule, it is among the closest example of ‘harmoniousness’ in “the respective Western” context, and according to its moral implications, all Western nations have encouraged their societies to promote the development of individuality by laws and variable decrees of punishment that will ensure your systematical punishment if another individual was harmed by you or your actions. This could be called the Western ‘fragmentary approach’ to the Golden Rule.

Now we will look at the Eastern ‘inclusive approach’ to the Golden Rule. Confucius formulated his ‘doctrine of reciprocity’ roughly 500 years before Jesus did: “己所不欲，勿施于人，在邦无怨，在家无怨” (Do not do to others what you would not like yourself. In the state there will be no complaints, in the family there will be no complaints) (Confucius, Lun Yu, 12;2). This Golden Rule of Confucius is at the core of ‘harmoniousness’ in the East, and according to its moral implications, all East-Asian nations have encouraged their societies to promote the

cultivation of oneself as an integrated member of the collective with various decrees of obedience and filial piety that will ensure ‘shame and loss of face’ if the collective is harmed.

Few people in China fear the punishment by law for one’s misbehavior. What is feared most is the ‘loss of face’, the ‘feedback from the collective’, the ‘wrath of one’s family’, one’s ‘father’s judgment’, and, yes, sometimes the Party official’s patronizing, if not infantilizing, words “This disgraceful ‘child’ now prefers to feel ashamed”. When Zi Gong [子贡] asked the Master: “Is there one word that can serve as a principle of conduct for life?”, Confucius replied: “It is the word ‘shu (恕)’ – reciprocity” (Confucius, *Lun Yu*, 15;23)

As an interim result, let us say that this simple Golden Rule: “Do not onto others what you do not like yourself” is implemented in the West by laws and punishment, and in the East by morals and sense of shame:

道之以政，齐之以刑，民免而无耻，道之以德，有耻且格。

If the people are governed by laws and punishment is used to maintain order, they will try to avoid the punishment but have no sense of shame.

If they are governed by the virtue and rules of propriety [ritual] are used to maintain order, they will have a sense of shame and will become good as well. (Confucius, *Lun Yu* 2;3)

Next, let us assume that neither Jesus Christ nor Confucius is the voice of God, but the proposition they wanted to talk across really was intended to be universal. What difference would it make? We would still have to read *The Bible* or *The Analects* to make sense of the real world. The human mind needs context. That is the bottom line. In the Western context, ‘harmoniousness’ is *more* Christianity-inflected while in the East context, ‘harmoniousness’ is *more* Confucian-inflected. This is an example of what I meant by understanding ‘harmoniousness’ in the “respective Western context” and in the “respective Eastern context”.

In the same way, other concepts should be understood “in the European” or “in the Asian context” before someone rushes into any international actions or conclusion, be it on human rights, political reform, economic theories, or euthanasia.

Returning from the excursion about the proper way to discuss Eastern and Western ideas about seemingly the ‘same’ concept, let us now continue with the latest trend in the world. As I said before, communist theory, although to a large extent Western co-manufactured by Marx and Lenin, was almost fundamentally ‘ejected’ from the Western hemisphere thereafter, giving the East considerable amount of time and freedom to experiment and develop its theories further. After communism was ‘ejected’, and after the demise of the U.S.S.R. in 1991, that same process of ‘ejection’ is now taking place with ‘harmoniousness’, and all ideas about tolerance that go with it.

The West, despite all its patronization and sympathy for Asia, is fundamentally rejecting the Asian “inclusive approach” right from under our very eyes. The more of Asia is insisting on the universal of ‘oneness’, ‘balance’, ‘harmony’, or ‘integration’: e. g. “Our goal is a harmonious world!” the more Asia’s theories become hers, and hers alone. The West will not waste its energies on anything that is inner-world dependent and all-inclusive; only that what the West discovered upon breaking that ‘all-inclusive something’ into its parts will make sense to him. This is the consequence of the deductive Western “fragmentary approach” towards nature and all things.

Not that the U.S.A. or European nations do not have their own ideas about harmoniousness, far from it, they have various, often fragmentary, even conflicting ideas about it. They always have. After the ‘ejection’ of communism from the Western hemisphere, in the case of dialectical materialism, all major parties of Western capitalistic democracies quickly found their own ways to attend to and satisfy its people and to curb production and the accumulation of material wealth, and it all happened without turning human beings into submissive production units with no human rights. Today, Germany and France are arguably more socialist than socialist China ever will be.

In the case of universal ‘harmoniousness’, the major parties in deductive Western democracies already have found their own ways to attend to the people’s need for ever more ‘international flights’, ‘foreign currencies’, ‘world trade’, ‘exchange’, ‘cooperation’, and ‘tolerance’, all well covered and served in Western terminology such as ‘globalism’, ‘multiculturalism’, ‘cultural diversity’, ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’ etc., and therefore need not having any Asian alternative to make their own citizens happy.

As a consequence, in a Western dominated world no one could care less about “equilibrium is the great foundation of the world, and harmony is its path“ (Zi Si, Zhong Yong, 1), “the function of rites (‘li’) lies in harmoniousness” (Confucius, Lun Yu 1;12), or “to live with a culture is to understand that culture” (Laozi, 54). It is indeed very difficult to conceive that today’s Obama, Sarkozy, Brown or Merkel would favor ‘oneness’ over ‘westernization’; most unlikely candidate of it all: the Chinese dream of ‘tianxia’ (天下, All under heaven). Again, this is the bottom line. There is no need for China’s outmoded senses of tolerance, kindness, gracefulness, Japan’s ‘universal emptiness’, Indian ancient senses of ‘universal equality’, ‘universal tolerance’ or indeed any other spiritual idealism, no matter how many hundreds of years those great Eastern sages spoke prior to Jesus Christ, Bill Gates, or Harry Potter.

Billions of Asian hearts will have puffed with pride on hearing that their countries were joining the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO,) another international conference, all in the name of ‘globalism’ that so much resembles the pursue of ‘interconnectness’, ‘oneness’, ‘balance’ or ‘harmoniousness’ and the Eastern need for ‘self-cultivation’ that has been at the root of all traditional Eastern societies from the beginning

of time. Western science, technology transfer and materialism seem like a freebie or giveaway if only the West came along and acknowledged *your* cultural values and *your* civilization's achievements. But therein lies the rub: Except for a tiny number of experts, hardly any Westerner has ever learned the Eastern origin story of tolerance as for the example in the *Book of History* (书经, c. 600-300 BC), the *Tipitaka* (or Pali Canon, c. 500-400 BC), has heard about the great hero Fu Xi (伏羲, legendary ruler and forerunner of the *Book of Changes* or *I Ching* [易经] in 2800-2737 BC), or the Hindu/Jain traditions of 'Anekantavada' (meaning 'Non-one-endedness', a philosophy of universal tolerance), 'Syadvada' (a philosophical tradition of subjectivity and relativity in discourses) and so on:

How can someone appreciate someone else's cultural values if he does not know their content, language or their origin? The answer is, no one can; and the West will not appreciate Eastern spirituality and its ways. Was it not Thomas S. Kuhn, the great American scientist, who said that "rival paradigms are incommensurable" (Kuhn, 1970)? Incommensurability means that although it is always possible to imitate each other, albeit it is almost impossible to understand a Chinese paradigm through let us say the conceptual framework and terminology of the European looking-glass, and vice versa. Of course, the inductive East and the deductive West keep trying: "Now that 30 million Chinese study piano and another 10 million study violin, Western classical music well may have become the dominant form of transcendental experience for Asians even while Western neuroscientists dabble in what they think is Buddhism" (aTimes, 2008/07).

Luckily - or rather unluckily, depending one's point of view - there are appearances. Appearances can make happy, indeed. What appears to the integration-based Eastern nations as a continuation of their own traditional search for 'oneness' and 'harmoniousness', that same process appears to the Europeans and Americans as the ingenious, creative deconstruction of the East, the processes of total 'westernization'. Regardless of the looming dangers if things do not work out as expected... can there be anything done about this terrible cultural misunderstanding?

The psychological conundrum for Asia is that due to its induction-based views on the world, it does not perceive those European countries as isolated and self-sufficient, but rather as integrated and dependent part of humankind, and thus - out of need for universal tolerance and harmony – readily believes them; at least will always consider Western views.

The West, however, is different. Apart from a few premises that it chose to work with at any specific time, the West usually does not consider other countries' noises and fusses. It does not take into account all the facts, the history, the "respective Eastern context", the whole picture, but isolates each time a few propositions and draws its conclusions accordingly. Its deductive method is precise and sharp as a surgeon's knife. When the German spokesman of German National TV, ZDF (Zweite Deutsche Fernsehen) came to Shanghai in 2008 and hold a talk on 'Journalism governed by public law', he embarrassed his host, the Tongji University of Shanghai (and in my

estimation a lot more audiences), by laying down some abstract German premises about ‘press-freedom’ and ‘human-rights’ and then drawing his (very German) conclusion about what any rational man should consider is ‘good journalism’, following a top-to-down deductive-style hell of an argument, like a surgeon that came and undertook a liver-transplantation. There is no option of using chopsticks for a liver-transplantation, you see. There can be no mistake about what a liver is. And about where it is. All the parameters are highly scientific and precise. We know what a good operation looks like, and we know what follows if all the premises are true: the patient walks out of the hospital. When a Chinese professor in broken German language informed the audiences firstly that reality is more complex and complicated, that the Chinese position has to be taken into account, and secondly that in particular German media-coverage on the Tibet-incidents was biased, often untrue, and that is even used Nazi-terminology such as ‘Jubelchinesen’ (Chinese volunteers who simulate spontaneous joy and cheerfulness) for media-coverage on the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games torch-relay, the German lecturer replied in disbelief: “Nun seien Sie mal nicht so weinerlich!” meaning “Come on, don’t be such a whiner!”.

Chapter 12: A loveless Darwinian desert

The great scientists Thomas S. Kuhn (1922-1996), Karl Popper (1902-1994), the venerable Scottish essayist Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881), and the great historian Joseph Needham (1900-1995) all concluded that the evolution of science is *non-relativistic*, which tells us that the deduction-based West was more or less predestined to pick up the scientific way.

No matter what those few smart Eastern individuals invented - in China 'few' meant a lot –, be it the compass in 1100 BC – really a mechanical one, the so called 'South-pointing carriage' of the Duke of Zhou of the Zhou Dynasty (c. 1100 BC) and a forerunner of the magnetic compass which was also invented in China around 10 BC, the so called 'South-Pointing Ladles' - the magnet, the kite, the astronomical clock, the pizza, the noodle, or even gunpowder, it all does not elevate to greatness if one's society is a victim of its own inward-looking traditions.

Once these Asian technologies 'popped up' in the West, the European nations took their chances, developed the sciences, increased industrial output, perfected weaponry, boiled the noodle, and set out to conquer and divide the globe among themselves. Only then the West invented patents, copy rights and laws to ensure it would forever stay in power, cunningly assuming that – as I explained before - evolution, even the evolution of sciences, is a gradual, progressive development (like a ladder, you see), and whoever 'patents' its beginnings legally owns its progress.

For obvious reasons, the Western 'scientific accomplishments' of the past still confuses many Asians, who did, as I said elsewhere, excel in so many arts, crafts, and the humanities, but – more importantly - outnumber the Europeans today by roughly 6 to 1. In a 'democratic' world order, Asian opinions would outweigh European ones by 6 to 1. China in particular would win any poll against angry Germany, France and Britain by 16:1, 21:1 and 21:1 respectively: "Hey, you Europeans, you want 'democracy' and 'equality', well, here you are! Where do we sign?"

Would it be wrong, in a democratic world order, to drastically reduce the influence of Europe's 'Great Three' in the world - in terms of political, economic, and voting power – to 1,26%, 0,84%, and 0,81% respectively, according to their share of world's population? I think so, because I grew up in a democratic system. Yet, this is not going to happen. Not in the UN, not in Europe. The European mind got itself absolutely accustomed to the idea that it constitutes the world's 'bourgeoisie' or 'global elite' while the developing world is human soup. It has no *Tact*, thus no respect for the rest, and it will never know its proper place. Western seemingly universal ideas of 'democracy' and 'equality' stop at their own garden's fences. Beyond that lies a vast and loveless *Darwinian desert*.

As someone once wisely observed (Laozi if you must know): "small countries have few people". Germany, with its 82 millions people, is not a small country in any European sense. On the world-scale however, it ranks only

14th after Philippines (93 millions) and Vietnam (86 millions). Over 30% of Germany's population has a migration background. The German language, although being the majority language (with regards to native speakers) in Europe, will not be able to achieve clear supremacy of place in European, letting alone any Asian belief structure, nor does the German culture it promotes. The German-Jewish connection before 1938 was a winning-formula for Nobel Prizes, but that, too, slipped away forever.

Today, China and India want German cars, technology, and knowledge... they certainly do not want German culture. When the Schroeder government in 2000 over-confidently announced to tap the vast market of 2,000,000 Indian soft-were programmers - "We want 20,000 of them by the end of the year!" -, only a tiny fraction of that, 1,200 Indians applied to Berlin (*Markt und Chance*, 2001). That must have been just about everybody who applied got green.

To sum up, it is highly unlikely, for the time being, that Germany, or ever smaller European states like France, Britain or Italy could ever be the role model for India, Japan, Korea, or China. In fact, it would be foolish to adapt the German ways, or the French ways, or the British ways, and consequently, to force Asia and say that any single European country should be the role model for India, Japan, Korea or China is a racist stance that we must never ever take again.

Chapter 13: The psychology of communion

The bias of ‘Western standard’ – after all, the whole project of ‘Cultural Anthropology’, 18th, 19th, 20th centuries’ orientalism, letting alone the ‘History of Sciences in China’, an objective presentation of “what China herself thought about her traditions” (Butler, 1927), are all *Western disciplines* - caused some difficulties for unabashed historians to distinguish between *genuine* Western thought and classy *adaptations* of East-Asian or Hindu concepts in the West. There are some prominent examples of the latter: Derrida’s ‘différance’, Foucault’s ‘archaeology’, Husserl’s ‘transcendental phenomenology’, even Satre’s ‘existentialism’ - although highly original – all have orientalist themes (Moore, 2003). Some Western protagonists revealed their Asian sources; other did not (Wang, 2001).

Hegel’s ‘philosophy of history’ and ‘Weltgeist’ or ‘world-spirit’, the ‘great man theory’, all which took Europe’s intelligentsia by storm, were a blatant extension of Mahayana Buddhism concepts such as ‘Brahmatmaikyam’ (the merge of Brahman and atman) and Hindu tradition of ‘Vardhamana Mahavira’ (The Great Hero) or the ‘Tirthankaras’ (Sanskrit for fordmakers).

In his *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (1819), Schopenhauer wrote:

“Wollte ich die Resultate meiner Philosophie zum Maßstab der Wahrheit nehmen, so müßte ich dem Buddhismus den Vorzug vor anderen Religionen zugestehn” (Schopenhauer, 1819).

Nietzsche’s concepts of ‘Übermensch’ (lit. over-man) and ‘Meister- und Sklavenmoral’ (lit. master- and slave-morality) are heavily influenced by Hindu concepts of ‘vasudeva’ (super-human) and ‘jatis’ (hereditary groups or castes), while he elsewhere confessed, after having read Louis Jacolliot’s 1876 translation of the *Manava Dharmasastra*, that the Vedic *Laws of Manu* was his “epitome of all civic moral order” (Behler, 1987). And last, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and his philosophy of Western ‘being-ness and time’ was a direct response to Eastern concepts of ‘non-being-ness and non-time’ (May, 1996).

And then there was Adolf Hitler (1889-1945). Like Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), Hitler worshipped might, and might was what he dreamt about when his utopian ‘Third Reich’ took shape in *Mein Kampf* (1925/26). Nazi ideologies were deeply influenced by 18th, 19th, and 20th century’s German orientalism, and I am not just referring to the Buddhist ‘Swastika’ as the chosen symbol for Aryan ascendancy (referring to the ‘Aryan-invasion theory of India’).

The idea of ‘Third Reich’ did not, as many Western historians tend to believe, only derive from studying the Holy Roman Empire, or French or British colonial empires at their heydays. Far from it, neither the ancient nor

past nor recent or contemporary highly diversified European histories had a precursor to the things lying ahead of the Nazi master-plan: It was the German's 18th, 19th and 20th centuries' obsession with Oriental themes, this so-called longing for the 'exotic Other', romanticism, nostalgia for greatness, and its rise to great power status between 1871 and 1918 (Said, 1978; Žizek, 1997-2001), all which pressured the Germans into their search for identity and cultural legitimacy, e. g. Greek roots, the Holy German Empire, the Aryan invasion of India etc..

The rational, analytic, deductive Western Germans, consciously or unconsciously indulging into a spiritual mission to make Europe 'coherent', and 'uniform' – they really wanted to *easter-fy* it. By doing that, by adopting the inductive Eastern ways, some historians believe German orientalism had "helped to destroy Western self-satisfaction, and to provoke a momentous change in the culture of the West: the relinquishing of Christianity and classical antiquity as universal norms" (Marchand, 2001).

The Germans wanted to destroy deductive Europe's regional, provincial, fragmentary character, that is, to write an ethnocentric Aryan history – just like in China they wrote the ethnocentric Chinese history - that connects simultaneously to the past, present, and future, that worships its great ancestors and their deeds, that gives authority to memory and historians, that sees human action and its consequences reigning over time, rather than just passing through time in discrete temporal units - days, hours, minutes. To the horror of their Western neighbours, the newly elected and well-educated Nazis despised the deductive, rational, and all-fabricated 'intellect', but adored the intuitive, spiritual, and all-human 'instinct'.

It is no surprise then that even today the average American Joe has great difficulties in distinguishing between German-style totalitarianism or Soviet-style/Maoism totalitarianism, and there is no blaming him for that. As Hannah Arendt convincingly put it: they were two sides of the same coin, not opposing philosophies (Arendt, 1973).

And it is no surprise either that to this day the majority of Western scientist, who have never sufficiently studied the East-West dichotomy, ascribe history's darkest events to mere outer-world, materialistic circumstances like brainless youth bulges (Heinsohn, 2003, 2005), guns, germs and steel (Diamond, 2003, 2006), or other material convulsions, while ignoring all the evidences that suggest that the ultimate cause of history's darkest events was an inner-world, monstrous, deadly *human psychology*: the communion of Eastern and Western souls:

European "discovery" of India brought the opportunity to appropriate its rich tradition for the sake of the European's obsession to re-imagine their history and status. Many rival theories emerged, each claiming a new historiography. The new European preoccupation among scholars was to reinvent identities of various European peoples by suitably locating Sanskrit amidst other selective facts of history to create Grand Narratives of European supremacy [...] in order to fulfill their own ideological imperatives of reconciling

theology with their self-imposed role of world ruler.

(Kapil Kapoor, 2001, here condemning the promoters of Aryan theories such as Max Müller [1823-1900])

What the German orientalist and politicians prior to 1938 suggested – leaning towards Eastern-inflected concepts such as Mackinder’s ‘heartland theory’ (1904), Max Müller’s ‘Aryan supremacy’ (1892), and Nietzsche’s prophetic ‘Übermensch’ (1885) - was that the Western hemisphere needs a domesticated super-race of Aryans in order to occupy Eurasia and counter the disciplined, ever increasing and expanding powers of the Eastern hemisphere. Germany feared the rising inductive East, not so much its Western neighbours, among which it was already the most powerful cultural offspring. She was accurate, but all from the wrong premises, about the challenges from the East, as the Allies and NATO indeed needed another 46 years until the Cold War was won, a pyrrhic victory, as it turned out: Today the West is helpless and in disbelief, staring at the (until now peaceful) rise of not one, recovering Russia, but more than eleven new players: China, India, the nine ‘Tiger States’, plus the world’s number two standing (economic) superpower, Japan.

In order to understand the mechanics of ‘history’s darkest events’ caused by an inner-world, monstrous, deadly psychology, the communion of Eastern and Western souls, this concept, we have to talk again about *Right* and *Tact*.

The German’s pre-war master-plan was (as proven) hard (and physically impossible) to execute in the real world, but not at all difficult in our imagination to comprehend as serious student of history today. What the Germans - in reference to what I said before about *Right* and *Tact* - did was *Right*, but *without Tact*. Now, before you send me ill-wishes for arguing that the German were “right”, we should carefully examine the meaning of ‘righteousness’ in this “respective European context”. The Germans did the right thing, but not in a tactful manner. Order, discipline, submission for unity is *Right*, so is the *unity of Europe* led by its most populous, industrious and powerful people, the Germanic people. Was it not the enlightenment philosopher and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) who urged the Europeans that every individual must submit to the ‘general will’ and become a ‘indivisible part’ of the whole or the ‘national will’ (Rousseau, 1762)?

Striving for unification, as opposed to separatism, was the ‘right’ thing to do for the most populous nation of Europe, Germany. China did unify, the United States did unify and India did unify. But the Germans did not know how to do it, they did know all about *Right*, but did not know about *Tact*. They thought that scientific methods and powerful materialism may compensate and outmanoeuvre all *Tact* and thus caused unbelievable suffering and pain. The Germans had to brutally force all Europeans into submissions, instead of *tactfully* leading them into submission. This is an example of the inner-world, monstrous, deadly psychology of communion: the Western analytic-deductive mind of ‘deconstruction’ engaged with Eastern intuitive-inductive theories of ‘oneness’ and caused an historical holocaust, just as the Japanese intuitive-inductive mind engaged with Western analytic-deductive theories and set out to destroy their neighbors with their newly won, uncontrollable power.

The Japanese, of course, were different from the Germans; traditional Japan culture knew about *Tact*. And, before the dawn of modernity, they knew about *Right* too. Japan before the dawn of modernity knew that it was *not Right* for them to rule over the ancient and mighty Chinese, Russians, Koreans – it wasn't *Right* for them to aspire rulership over Asia. But when they adopted to the Western analytic-deductive mindset, they ignored what was *Right*, set foot on the Asian continent, and when they were confronted with the reality of things, that it was *not Right* for this tiny island to rule over mainland China, they panicked and threw away their *Tact*, slaying their prisoners of wars (as with the Rape of Nanking) just because this small island folk was neither physically nor psychological able to rule (letting alone to justify) over an ancient culture and hundred of millions of Chinese, Koreans etc.

Similar to the German misery, this misery of Japan, too, was initiated by the careless communion of the inductive Eastern and deductive Western souls, causing untold suffering and pain. Fortunately, when Russian and Chinese souls adapted to Western-minded communism in the beginnings, they refined it in the last minute, calling it Stalinism and Maoism, yet look at what destruction and pity the communion of Eastern and Western souls still caused to their own people.

The German holocaust, Japanese militarism, Soviet and Chinese communism, all these are gruesome warnings about what I meant with “the ultimate cause of history's darkest events was an inner-world, monstrous, deadly psychology: the communion of inductive Eastern and deductive Western souls”.

The main focus of academic attention in the Western analytic-deductive world about those darkest events in history seems to be, of course, the ‘methods’, the ‘what’ and ‘how’ by which the suffering and pain was executed; not the ‘souls’, not the ‘who’ did the execution. About the ‘methods’, the ‘what’ and ‘how’, the ‘German Auschwitzes’ or the Japanese ‘Rape of Nankings’, there is so much written today, that I shall only add this jewel: against all the hypocrisy of Western educationalist about the unbelievable cruel methods used to annihilate one's enemy, all those methods are the least difficult to comprehend for any serious student of history. On the contrary, a basic understanding of the cruelest methods available to destroy one's enemy, in this century, is the minimum tactical, if not crucial intellectual requirement of any 14-year old ‘virtual officer’ today playing a killer-game or a strategic computer-game like Warcraft (Blizzard, 2001), where distinctive races fight for honor, resources and territories, or just like reading a bestselling fiction like J. R. R. Tolkien's The Lord of the Rings (Shippey, 2002; Garth, 2005).

Analyzing methods, numbers or any other materialistic components of “history's darkest events”, the ‘what’ and ‘how’, is *de-humanized bean-counting*; a more accurate understanding of what happened to the people of this world, to us, in our darkest times can only be achieved by also looking at the ‘who’, ‘who’ are we, by looking at

our souls.

Having talked about the presence of *Right* and the absence of *Tact* of the Germans prior to the Great Wars, we must not forget to discuss another important component of the German mindset - 'Will', the Will to make great things happen, the Will to power.

As said elsewhere, Europe before "history's darkest events" was fractured, balkanized, useless, *tactless*, and in moral decline anyway. The only sense of unity came from the Church, but the self-interested, materialistic European nation states had separated from this source of spiritual unity in favor of independence, nationalism and sovereignty. Then and before the Great Wars, who could ever possibly unite all Europeans in order to face the civilizations of the East? The Englishman always knew what was *Right*, it was not *Right* for them to set foot on the continent, nor to aspire rule over Europe. In Europe, they made no great leaders either. The French were few in number, had a sorry history of defeat and failures against the British, and in any case, similar to the Scandinavian countries, could trace back their ancestors to Germanic heartland tribes.

The Germans of central Europe, in 1930 by far the most populous nation in Europe, 60 millions within Germany not counting Austria and the diasporas all over Europe, had been the discredited loser of World War One, stripped of all overseas colonies and 1/3 of its European territory, with their enormous sense of 'righteousness', naturally felt that their situation was 'not right', that no gang-up of (in their nationalistic view) mediocre European neighbor-states with their tinsel cultures should keep Europe little:

There is a Chinese saying that all mothers teach their children: Xiao Xin "make your heart small!" That really is the basic tendency of all later civilizations: I do not doubt, the ancient Greeks would spot today's European self-inflicted reduction in size at first sight, - this alone would be sufficient to disgust them.

(Friedrich Nietzsche, [1] 1909)

Needless to say that Nietzsche had his own vocabulary for the East-West dichotomy. He distinguished between two modes of culture: the (Western) individual, rational, technical, cognitive, useful, and hierarchical *Apollonian*; and the (Eastern) collective, emotional, sexual, mystic, fertile, revolutionary *Dionysian* (Nietzsche, 1872). Any reader knowledgeable in the history of thought will have noticed that pre-war Germany, in an incredible shift of paradigm later supervised by the Nazis, had "*cultivated*" upon their soil for the first time in history of man an inherently *Apollonian*/Western culture with the acquired mindset of a collective, emotional, sexual, mystic, fertile, revolutionary *Dionysian*/Eastern soul – with disastrous consequences for the well-being of Europe and the Western community.

It is helpful to remind oneself that there is a reason why so many of the above German thinkers were so

evidently admired among intellectual circles in the East, most notably in Japan [Kyoto School, 京都派], India, but also China: The intuitive Germans, from Goethe over Hegel, Schelling, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Heidegger etc. were all pregnant with Oriental thought.

So, there has been a borrowing and adaptation of Eastern concepts throughout European history, sometimes for the worse (as in case of pre-war Germany), sometimes for the better, however the median of standard and the narration of history remained *Euro-centric*. Asian values were communicated, often ridiculed, and never openly acknowledged. Whatever the East offered in those strange languages and spiritual terminology, it did not matter much unless it was translated and sealed for approval by the dominant civilization: the West. Why this Western ‘verbal dominance’ over the course of world history? We are looking for answers in the next chapter.

Chapter 14: Cultural evolution

Let us imagine two people, Mr. East and Mr. West, who quite differ in their attitudes, behaviors and ways of perception. Why, let us openly employ terms from ‘Differential Psychology’ to describe them. Mr. West is more rationally driven, while Mr. East is more intuitively driven. Although both could have developed the whole range of possible talents to a sufficient degree, yet each of them dominantly practiced one set of particular talents more than the other. Given the limited time of practice during a lifetime, many people may become excellent artists or brilliant scientists, but rarely does someone triumph in both areas. Why? Because, based on our limited time and resources, in a very competitive society, it is a very practical decision for Mr. East to do something different from Mr. West. Once that decision has been made, both will start cultivating their strengths, while neglecting their weaknesses. It is about finding one’s niche, occupation, purpose, or destiny in life. The time to make that practical decision is usually at an early stage, and thus it not only depends on genetic factors, but is often heavily influenced by exterior factors such as family situation, parental support and teachers. Mr. East became an excellent artist, while Mr. West became a brilliant scientist, because the former came from a family of artists, and the latter came from a family of scientists. If this is how it worked out for two individuals, Mr. East and Mr. West, why not for certain groups, even entire civilizations like East and West?

Although Aristotle’s *analytical-deductive method* (384-322 BC) and Confucius’ *intuitive-inductive method* (551-479 BC) seems purely accidental, singular, isolated incidents, but once they introduced those methods, one *more* logic-scientific, the other *more* intuitive-social, they two methods helped shaping their respective civilization, and unintentionally pushed them apart into two different directions.

In anthropology, we are now informed that powerful individuals or important texts which dictate or maintain certain group-level codes and behaviors can lead to the evolution of an efficient social system (Reynolds, 1983; Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Boyd, 2003; Mace, 2005). Contrary to popular belief, cultural evolution leads to systems that can be more stable than the Mendelian (genetic) ones, because culture is less sensitive to migration. That is believable, isn’t it? All branches of Buddhism today - most of them found in Japan, China, and Korea - are founded on Sakyamuni’s teachings (c. 563-483 BC) in Nepal, later forming the Tipitaka Canon (c. 100 BC), written down during the Fourth Buddhist Council on Sri Lanka/India, slowly declined in India (c. 100-1192 AD), revived in China (starting from c. 100 BC-100 AD) and flourished ever since in Korea (from c. 372 AD) and Japan (from c. 467 AD). This example of ‘Cultural evolution’ shows that any witnesses of change in turn may change their group’s belief, learn new languages and ideas, or choose their religion, thus promote heavy cultural evolution faster than the group would be able to change their skin and eye-color in genetic evolution (Mace 2005).

Since cultural evolution – although groups influencing each other’s evolutions - does not necessary develop simultaneously to genetic evolution, therefore two nations may have quite a similar culture and values but not

necessarily share the same high degree of racial phenotypes, and vice versa (Reynolds 1983; Cavalli-Sforza et al 1994, Mace 2005).

It is difficult to find out who is the greatest individual in human history. But we have some estimation of the world's most best-selling books, although it will disappoint a lot of China-bashers: Number one is 毛主席语录 (Mao zhuxi Yulu, Quotations from Chairman Mao), with over 6,5 billion copies sold since its first publication in 1966. Number two is The Bible, with close to 6 billion copies sold since its first publication around 100 BC-100 AD. Number three, four, and five are Chinese books, too: 新华字典 (Xinhua zidian, Xinhua Dictionary, 1957; 400 million), 毛主席诗抄 (Mao zhuxi shichao, Chairman Mao's Poems, 1966; 400 million), 毛主席文选 (Mao zhuxi wenxuan, Selected Articles of Mao Zedong, 1966; 252.5 million) (wikipedia, 2008). No further comment necessary.

During the cultural evolution of the East-West dichotomy, whoever witnessed those important processes – in sociology we say: formations - initiated by Aristotle and Confucius and their successors who taught those new methods – in sociology we say: variants - to another witness and so on. This way the new method or variant is replicated within that group. Generation after generation all copy or imitate each other, we say they form logical or intuitive series. Confucius was continued by Mencius; Aristotle was continued by Plato; Jesus Christ was continued by St. Paul etc.

Now, we might agree that Confucius was the initiator of what we now call Confucianism and the *Confucian Four Books and Five Classics* (四書五經, si shu wu jing) and that the pre-Confucian inductive method of the *I Ching* (易经) were the initiators to Confucius' *Great Learning* (大学, da xue); furthermore, that the following great Chinese philosophers somehow form a necessary series: Confucius [孔子] (551-479 BC), Mo Zi [墨子] (470-391 BC), Lao Zi [老子] (c. 400 BC) and Zhuang Zi [庄子] (370-301 BC); or Zhang Zai [张载] (1020-1077), Cheng Yi [程颐] (1033-1107), Sima Guang [司马光] (1019-1086), Zhu Xi [朱熹] (1130-1200); or Wang Fuzhi [王夫之] (1619-1692); finally, that during the Warring States Period (战国时代, Zhanguo shidai, c. 500-221 BC) the 'Hundred Schools of Thought' (诸子百家, Zhuzi baijia) emerged in China – among others -: Confucianism, Mohism, Taoism, Legalism, Logicism, Buddhism, and the Yin-yang School etc. and that all these schools, however original they claim to be, all were heavily inflecting each other, citing each other, but still with the *I Ching* text, the King Wu of Zhou (周武王, 1111-1105 BC) and his brother, the Duke of Zhou (周公), also named "God of Dreams" for his good governance, and later Confucian at their very core:

儒、释、道三教，譬如三个铺面挂了三个招牌，其实都是卖的杂货，柴米油盐都是有的，不过儒家的铺子大些，佛、道的铺子小些，皆是无所不包的。

Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism... are like the signboards hung outside three shops, and although they sell mixed provisions, albeit there is nothing they don't stock in all the shops. (Liu E, 1909)

Once the foundations had been laid, what followed had to refer to its Confucian initiator(s). Even now, 2500+ years after the *I Ching* [易经], *Lun Yu* [论语], or *Dao De Ching* [道德经], the Chinese people embrace the Confucian ideal of a ‘harmonious society (和谐社会, hexie shehui)’, ‘oneness of man and heaven (天人合一, tian ren he yi)’, ‘everything under the heaven or Celestial Empire (天下, tianxia)’. This relationship between Confucius, the ‘inductive approach’, and the Chinese collective mind is so intimidating, that it makes me think that if there had been a great individual much earlier than the Duke of Zhou, Confucius, or the mystical Fu Xi -, maybe 10,000 years, maybe 20,000 years earlier; that same individual could have paved – similar to bottle-neck situations in genetic evolution (Maddison et al, 2007), - the way for a continuous specialization of the Asiatic people in following down the inductive path, just in the same way as for example system biological methods of likelihood of simple birth/death events of Buddhist sages may correlate quite neatly with the founding in India and separation in China, Korea, and Japan of different Buddhist sub-branches, leading in Japan, as a random example, to the founding of the Jodo-shu School (净土真宗, Pure Land; 1133-1212 AD) by Honen (法然, 1133-1212 AD) and later Shinran (親鸞, 1173-1263 AD).

The affinity for ‘bodhisattvas’, that is enlightenment beings in the state of pre-buddhahood, in all South- and East-Asian societies is well known, but by no means uniform or arbitrary. Far from it, it is very regional, according to each country’s historical context and ability to absorb new schools of thoughts. Maitreya (弥勒佛), the original ‘next’ Future Buddha, over the centuries declined into just another bodhisattva among the many bodhisattvas in the Hindu/Buddhist universe in India. In Tibet, many more local, Tibetan deities were installed, with Maitreya becoming ever less significant. In Western China, where Buddhism struggled with Daoism and Confucianism, Chinese traditional culture saw no need for a ‘next’ Buddha, thus used the myth of the Chinese monk Budai (布袋) from 9th century China during the Five Dynasties period, in order to incorporate him as the personification of Maitreya: known in the West as the big-bellied, happy ‘Laughing Buddha’, but who really is no Buddha at all. In Japan, Maitreya (jp: Miroku) finally could no longer hold his eminent position as prospective future Buddha, but instead became one of the ‘Seven Gods of Fortune’ (Shichi Fukujin, 七福神), often depicted riding on their ship, the Takarabune (宝船). If that allegorical ship would have set its sails and crossed the Atlantic Ocean to the U.S.A., what kind of promotion would the enlightened one be able to attain in the minds of American people? Chances are he would become another wooden decoration in some giant blue-and-yellow IKEA warehouse, with back in Sweden headquarter 10,000 Hindus protesting against yet another great insult of featuring a toilet seat Buddha - that’s right, a big pancake-face of Buddha covering your ‘loo’ (APworldstream, 2002).

The evolution of culture is real (Dunbar, 1999; Diamond, 2003), so is the evolution of written texts (Howe et. al, 2005), language (Gray et. al, 2000; Mace, 2005; Haspelmath, 2005), and religion (Reynolds, 1983), the only major obstacle in anthropology – as opposed to archeology - being to locate manuscripts or records written before the 5th-4th millennium BC (Fischer, 2005).

After so much ‘what’, it is high time for some scientist to come up with a ‘why’. Why had the evolution of cultures led to this equilibrium of the two great cultural systems, the occidental and the oriental one, the inductive East and the deductive West, with no third great cultural system ever been invented? A possible theorem is this: because a third cultural system *does not exist*.

As all available evidences speak for themselves; to us speaks yet another Nobel laureate:

中 华传统文化的一大特色是归纳法，可是没有推演法。其中归纳法的来源是什么？“易者象也”，“圣人立象以尽意”，“取象比类：，”观物取象“都是贯穿《易经》的精神内。都是归纳法，是向上求整体”象“的方法。徐光启在翻译了欧几里德的几何原本以后，了解到推演法一个特点就是”欲前后更置之不可得“。就是一条一条推论不能次序颠倒。这跟中国传统不一样。中国传统对于逻辑不注意，说理次序不注意，要读者自己体会出来最后的结论。

The inductive method is a major feature of traditional Chinese culture, but not so the deductive method. What is the source of the inductive method in China? All these concepts of ‘Yimutology’ described in the Book of Changes. These are inductive methods to infer from the particular to the universal ‘form’. When Xu Guangqi translated Euclid’s Elements of Geometry, he immediately understood the strength of the deductive method: “the conclusion has to follow from the premises and not otherwise”. That direction of the reasoning process in deductive method cannot be reversed. Chinese tradition, however, was different. Chinese scholars did not put much attention to logical order; the reader would make sense of everything once he understood the final conclusion. (Yang Zhenning [杨振宁], 2004)

Recently, an historical milestone entitled *A History of the Chinese Civilization* (中华文明史, 2006), has been completed by three dozens prestigious professors (Yuan Xingpei, 2006) of Peking University after six years of work. Reading through some of it, indeed I cannot find a political or historical framework that could ever be considered in line with the political or historical framework of European thought. That has always been the case in Chinese history, whether in the *Records of the Warring States*, compiled in the Han Dynasty, or the *Records of the Grand Historian Si Maqian* (司马迁, c. 145-90 BC). In China, there has always been an entirely different approach to history, its people, and the notion of time (Wu, 2007, 2008):

So, we should just gently shift the frame from theoretical “time” to concrete “history”, and China’s rich millenary blood will at once throb into our veins, to flood our pages. We will engage in lively inter-communications with all the historic Wise, popular and academic among our celebrated Five Chinese Races. We learn from ancient Sages, to revise and add to them.

(Wu Kuang-Ming, 2007)

In the history books of ancient China, often still influencing the style and way of thought in today's textbooks, there are: generalizations; generalizations; the thought that China is a single entity; more generalization; the idea that all Chinese think and feel the same; that all China is 'one', all people are 'one', all have 'one' moral code; and that 'China' pins itself and all of its history against the 'Other' barbarians surrounding China (Nolde, 1966, Huan et. al, 1997). Till to this day, for the typical Western-educated scholar studying history in China is often a painstaking process – many experts despair at the horrible lack of regionalism, objectivity, glossaries, lack of reference material, logical structure, lack of punctuation or useful introduction, but instead we sinologist are greeted with loads of beautiful adjectives, great analogies, lovely sceneries, ethical evaluations, heart-breaking dialogues, personal comments and practical moral lessons. In fact, in Chinese literary traditions, and this is important to realize, if a man's intellect is able to perceive the 'interconnectedness', the 'greater whole' - this would make him a great scholar, a true gentleman, while all other lesser men almost inevitably will lose themselves only in unnecessary details and countless, seemingly unconnected, discriminations:

公都子問曰：“鈞是人也，或為大人，或為小人，何也？”孟子曰：“從其大體為大人，從其小體為小人。”曰：“鈞是人也，或從其大體，或從其小體，何也？”曰：“耳目之官不思，而蔽於物，物交物，則引之而已矣。心之官則思，思則得之，不思則不得也。此天之所與我者，先立乎其大者，則其小者弗能奪也。此為大人而已矣。”

Kung Tu Tzu said, "If all men are equal, how is it that there are greater and lesser men?" Mencius said, "Some follow their greater part and some follow their lesser part." "Why do some follow their greater part and some follow their lesser part?" Mencius said, "The organs such as the eye and ear cannot discriminate and are thus confused by things. Things are interconnected with other things, which lead one further away. The function of the mind is to discriminate - if you discriminate you will attain it. If you don't discriminate, you won't attain it. These are what Heaven has bestowed upon us. If you first establish yourself in the greater part, then the small part cannot be snatched away from you. This is the essential of being a great man." (Mencius, 6A.15)

Before the end of the 19th century, in China there were no 'philosophy', 'historiography' or 'literature', only the 'classics (經)', 'masters (子)', and 'historical records (史)' (Sisci, 2008). The authority of the living was derivative, depending upon the authority of the masters, who no longer were among the living (Arendt, 1993); and only through memorizing the classics and their transmissions through the historical records, a great man would be able to comprehend the depth and complexity of human existence (Li Wai-Yee, 2008). This is true of China today, where commentators on Chinese ancient texts still often treat them as closed system with complete internal coherence and assume 'pan-signification'. This reflects, of course, in politics. As if the sole reason of the past were to hold the future grand unity and authority of China today, at all costs of historical distortion (Ge, 2001).

As experience has shown us, no man or woman of importance in the Western world - if it's a non-sinologist - is going to read a Chinese history book (let alone being able to) unless it is translated into the English language, that

is, unless it is incorporated into 'Western history', which is nothing less than 'World History' itself. Because not a single non-Western society, it seems, is able to produce an alternative history to World History that the West would be able to read, it could be tempting to announce all other histories' 'dead'. Since the striving for different histories, or different versions of it, truly has come *to an end*, with evidently only one 'World History' left, Western man might as well continue this as "the chronicles" or simply "21st century, 22nd century,... etc." thus end history (of all other cultures) as we used to know it (Fukuyama, 1992).

With just one history left, the Western hemisphere is going to dictate how it is written. The content however might be telling a different matter, as we shall discuss next.

Chapter 15: A Copernican revolution

Looking at ‘World History’ - on the one side the rational, incredible West who ends all other ‘histories’ and promotes the universal language, English, and on the other side the intuitive, incredible East who closes the historic circuit and integrates the universal language, English - in this century, the 21st, it is nevertheless the East who holds a considerable advantage: It is the *bigger phenomenon*.

Let us make no mistake: communism and capitalism were made for *scale* and the *masses*, and scale and masses are now in *Asia*. So are *numbers*. So are the world’s greatest challenges such as economic stability, food shortages, pollution, environmental destruction, population explosions, youth bulges, and terrorism, all things literally crying out for more (global) attention. The *bigger* – or, as we talk about history, shall we say the *greater* the phenomenon a theory describes is, the greater that theory becomes. In the past, great phenomena often happened in isolation and did not automatically call for global attention. For example, the intellectual output of India is legendary; her civilization is older than the Greeks (c. 3300 BC); India taught the West how to count; it conquered and dominated China, Korea, and Japan *culturally* (I am talking, of course, about the influence of Buddhism) “for twenty centuries without ever having to send a single soldier across her border” (Hu Shi [胡适], 1891-1962), it was the source of enlightenment for Europe, and the main source of German philosophy in the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries. Similar, China during the early Ming Dynasty (1368-1421) accounted for roughly 25-30% of the world’s GDP, while the combined GDP of the European nations was only close to 20% (Needham, 1963; Maddison, 2006; Spence, 2001). One could say then, that China and India had indeed been ‘great phenomena’. Once the ‘potential’ of those ‘great phenomena’, those two great Eastern giants, had echoed in the West, that indeed could have been one among the most important reasons why the small European states – with all their trials of Eastern expansion, colonialism, and imperialism – always seemed to have a greater interest in Asia – its technologies, wealth, land and resources – than it was the other way round, but this, of course, is just speculation.

What is not a speculation is that Europe never turned enough attention to were it gets more complicated: the religious, ethical, and sociological wisdom of the East. Or better, that religious, ethical, and sociological wisdom that had been created by the East, which had not been created by the West. Today, times have changed and the great wheel of fortune has turned, and China and India and the other Asian states provide golden opportunities for theoretical innovations, the creation of new values, more than in any other part of the world (Lin, 2006). Thus, the 21st century is very likely to be the century of the “Chinese economist” and the “Indian computer scientists”, both countries already producing more university graduates than the United States or Europe, which, of course, themselves heavily rely on tens of thousands of Asian graduates and those priceless connections these graduates will mean for the future competitiveness of the Western societies.

Having established that Asia, in this century, constitutes the greater phenomenon than Europe or America, why

then should someone think that the Chinese culture or any other East-Asian culture is the sorry victim of westernization?

On the contrary, isn't it the case that not the West but the East is now nurturing (the content) of 'World History'? Where are today's Western politicians, historians, men-of-letters who stand up to the truth? 'World History' is becoming genuine not European, (let alone American, which is but an extension of the Eurasian people's achievements). Are Western leaders afraid that their countrymen are not mature enough to face the 'other humanity', the East, unless they are assured it is an inferior one?

China had encountered numerous invasions, like the Liao (907-1125 AD), Jin (during Northern Song, 1115-1234) or Jurchen, Yuan (1271-1368) or Mongols, and Qing (1644-1911) or Manchus, yet she absorbed them all. India in the 10th century alone was invaded seventeen times by the Muslim Mahmud Ghaznavi and his successors, by the Mongol Empire in 1221-1327, and, starting from the 15th century onwards, by the Portuguese, Dutch, French and British. Both China and India have assimilated or spilled out each and every invader. Furthermore, Russia, Vietnam, Thailand, Korea, Myanmar, Indonesia - none of these places appears to me as if the West had 'taken over'. Even Japan, the *American Geisha Ally* (Shibusawa, 2006), is so entirely different in its religious, cultural, ideological and psychological appearance, that to call it a Western progeny is an insult to Japan, its long history and its people. Lastly, no Muslim or Arab state, not even the occupied Iraq or Afghanistan strike me as Western "colonies" either, quite the opposite: many people secretly think it was Islam which brought down the US hegemony (by attacking the Twin Towers and provoking America's unproportional response), and it is Islam (and the Middle East) which is now felt as the next future force to be reckoned with – and, as an alternative cultural mode, it is certainly 'besieging Europe' (minorityinfo, 2008).

What could be behind this so-called process of 'westernization', if not the self-actualization of non-Western people and nations? No one would think about the West westernizing itself. The East is studying the ways of the deductive West and gets stronger; I ask: what did the West learn in the progress from the inductive East to get wiser?

Not much, because it is not in their natures to switch roles easily. That particular, aggressively progressive element of the materialistic-driven 'West in the East' has always been (statically) hopelessly outnumbered, short-sighted: it either complied or else had to leave for good - 'good' as in 'de-colonialism'. But it never loses its self-confidence in irritating, that is, in "better than the East", like a sand-corn on a plain. Naturally, the pattern has never changed and the destructive, dividing-and-conquering Europeans kept coming back, and they are still keep coming back today (if not in the form of their latest version, the war-loving, self-righteous Americans), not with their swords and guns if not necessary, but with their pens and patents; all the same, the West is now all about the East: World History is now all about the great phenomena; World History is about the final universal "oneness", and the

key to it is kept in the East.

Understandably, there is a most delicate degree of difference between let us say the prophet tempting the disciple and the disciple tempting the prophet; or: the human subjectivity deluding the world's objectivity and the world's objectivity deluding human subjectivity. Does not the East-West relationship, after its great derailment, facing a similar dilemma too? Is it not high time for a shift of paradigm, a 'copernican revolution' similar to that of Galileo in the field of astronomy and that of Kant in the field of metaphysics before? For 2,500 years of the East-West dichotomy, we were tempted into the belief that the human universe consists of the *West at its core* with all the *other cultures revolving around this core*. 'World history' worked fine that way.

Now, after having compiled so much evidence in this little book, I am not so convinced any more about that Western core. From the Eastern point of view, the distant peripheral Europe and America had the historical sense of mission to manipulate the East – the core. In physics, the core is always the most passive, most unwavering element. Passive and unwavering is exactly how the West perceives the East.

By the above definition, Europe and North America are understood as the active, peripheral forces revolving around whatever stable, passive and irremovable it is that occupies the core of the human universe - like the two hands molding a precious vase. However, the deductive West did not add any substance; it only formed, divided, conquered, ruled for a time, it invented thousand of new rules, new regulations, stucked its fingers into the clay, then did not know what to do next, it had no sense for Eastern form, substance and spirituality, and, alas, so bad the West was at human relationships, be it in form of missionaries, conquerors, soldiers, bankers or businessmen... the deductive West left its material imprints and emotional scars, but nothing that could ever transform the East into West.

There is a very active Western part... some Western nations recently fought tooth and nails on Eastern soil during the Cold War, and now the West is back again with thousands of business contracts and globalizing catechisms. Asia is indeed very busy, busy studying all those new theories and techniques from the various Western 'invaders', infinitively more so than the invaders could possibly learn or could possibly be willing to learn from the East... yet, all the same, it is the inductive East that attracts all these energies, all this Western attention. This pattern of the Western nations revolving around Asia makes me think that... it is the East who is at the core, one could say: the East, roughly since 1950, has not only become the world greatest phenomenon, but has also, slowly, shifted to the center of gravity of World History. The East and the inductive ways in which it excels are seen as the solution to humankind's problems: 'oneness'. If this world is truly to become a more stable, peaceful, albeit more complicated, 'integrated' place, a better place, as everyone now seems to believe it should, then the 'integration-based' East and the inductive ways are not only destined to play a greater role in all human and world affairs, they must also stand to that core!

Chapter 16: **The problem with Nature**

Since the more inductive East and the more deductive West are both part of a gigantic ecosystem called earth, it is import to understand how the two cultural hemispheres traditionally see their relationship with what truly matters to all of us: nature.

Given that the *analytically-based, deductive West* has the advantage of “processing information in a linear manner, that is from top to bottom, it collects a myriad of pieces, lines them up, and arranges them in a logical order before drawing the conclusions”, it is clearly the dominant hemisphere when it comes to articulate, explain and write down human history (brain.web, 2007).

The *integration-based, inductive East* on the other hand, “processes from bottom to top, holistically. It starts with the answer. It sees the big picture first, the great harmony, not the details”.

As a consequence of such a comparison, the deductive Western hemisphere is “not only thinking in a linear manner, processes in sequences, but is also a list maker, enjoys making master plans, and learns in sequences”. Western culture is “a good speller who makes rules to follow, works in the linear and sequential processing of math and scientific methods”.

By contrast, the inductive Eastern hemisphere processes information randomly. “It flips from one tack to another, it will get just as much done, but perhaps without having addressed priorities. It pays attention to coherence, greater meanings, illustrations and feelings”. Its memory is connected to “emotions and feelings, not dealing with things the way they are with reality but with ideal concepts”.

The inductive East, which naturally got a glimpse on the ‘whole picture’, is well aware of the job the deductive Western hemisphere is doing in Asia by deconstructing and manipulating the world and all things:

The West is “linear, sequential, concrete, logical, verbal, and reality-based.

However, the deductive West, which naturally experiences a myriad of little details that make up the world, is not receptive of the job the Eastern hemisphere is doing in striving for a coherent ‘wholeness’ and ‘interconnectiveness’.

The East is “holistic, random, symbolic, intuitive, nonverbal, and fantasy-oriented”.

A similar East-West comparison has been made by Li Dazhao [李大钊] (1888-1927), philosopher and co-

founder of the Communist Party of China:

东洋文明主静，西洋文明主动，一个动，一个静，这是一点。
东方是为自然的，西方是人为的；东方是安息的，西方是战争的；
东方是消极的，西方是积极的；东方是依赖的，西方是独立的；
东方是苟按的，西方是突进的；东方是因袭的，西方是创造的；
东方是保守的，西方是进步的；东方是直觉的，西方是理智的；
东方是空想的，西方是体验的；东方是艺术的，西方是科学的；
东方是精神的，西方是物质的；东方是灵的，西方是肉的；
东方是向天的，西方是立地的；
东方是自然支配人闻的，西方是人闻征服自然的。

The Eastern civilization is static,
while the Western civilization takes initiative;
one is active, while the other is passive, so much for that.
The East harmonies with nature, the West conquers it;
The East is tranquil, the West is aggressive;
The East is introvert, the West is extrovert;
The East is dependent, the West is independent;
The East is reserved, the West is advancing;
The East is submissive, the West is creative;
The East is conservative, the West is progressive;
The East is intuition, the West is reason;
The East is spiritual, the West is empirical;
The East is humanistic, the West is scientific;
The East is mind, the West is matter;
The East is spirit, the West is substance;
The East is inductive, the West is deductive;
The East takes man and nature as inseparable parts;
the West takes man as the conqueror of nature.

(Li Dazhao, 2006)

Li Dazhao's observations are in line with how Western scientists generally perceive themselves and their abusive relation with nature:

Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be governed by right reason and true religion. (Francis Bacon, 1620)

The separation of knowledge from ethics, or let us say a 'value-free knowledge' is what most obviously distinguished the Greek/Hellenistic/European civilization from all the others. For the deductive West, everything in the universe can be considered a potentially usable object that must be studied and manipulated so as to serve 'man and his cause'. This 'man and his cause', in the good old days of British Empire, meant, of course, the 'British aristocracy and her cause', but – during the European renaissance - had quickly turned into 'Western man and his Western cause'.

'Western man and his Western cause' – this was about as far it could be stretched. Enough human beings and territory was left out that could make the scientific, deduction-based West fulfill it's mission, namely, to force into submission all things – the entire material world and everything non-Western.

The Western 'scientific way' implies that there must be a non-scientific way, or just a 'non-scientific other' – nature and the 'other people' who value the unity with nature. Nature and the traditional people who align with nature are thus, by definition, positioned at the wrong side of the 'man-conquers-nature'- equation and consequentially must be totally subjugated, deconstructed (divided) and manipulated to the will of its scientific conqueror.

To sum this up, to any non-Western observer the West and its deeply intolerant 'scientific way' appears to be inherently *v i o l e n t* (Nandy, 1989).

Asia, and by that I mean virtually all societies from the Russians over the Indians to the Muslims, Chinese, and Japanese, by definition had been on the receiving end of 'World History'. They could help row, but not steer that boat. In an allegorical, Faustian sense, the political philosophers and scientist Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Adam Smith (1723-1790) were all among those great Western enlightenment philosophers trading the Western conscience for the power it meant over those who still had to compromise with their conscience.

Until the final (Faustian) 'reckoning', the Western powers - over all those centuries - could almost frivolously humiliate every other society on earth until all ethical ground were lost, and the very Eastern humanitarian notions of 'wholeness', 'harmoniousness' and 'oneness' became meaningless and undesirable to the average Western mind. What is most disturbing, however, is this: Even the slightest sign of a nearing of 'wholeness', 'harmoniousness' and 'oneness' is now reminding the West of its past 'failures' and 'shame' and thus, in the eyes of any analytical-deductive Westerner, *must be avoided at all costs*.

The final reckoning was considered only a matter of time, in Gandhi's words, until that 'other', be it nature or

man, in a most subtle manner strikes back on its tormenter and destroys the illusion of Western-sciences-only validity:

This [Western] civilization is such that one only has to be patient, and it will be self-destroyed.
(Mahatma Gandhi, 1938)

Gandhi was exaggerating; he did not believe that the West would simply destroy itself, or be destroyed by others, or that sciences would become invalid. But he believed in Eastern concepts of positive ‘value-creation’ and ‘non-violence’ that – in the long run – like all Eastern concepts of ‘tolerance’, ‘wholeness’, or ‘oneness’ would appeal to the Western imperialists’ sense of shame. And so it did:

人不可以無恥。無恥之恥，無恥矣。

A person cannot do without shame. If you are ashamed of your shamelessness, you will not need to be ashamed. (Mencius, 7A.6)

It is the old pattern, again: If the West searches for the *power over nature (matter)*; it is the East that searches for the *power over man (mind)*, and it is the healthy equilibrium that would benefit both of them and thus all of us.

Sadly, the analytical West is still patronizing ‘his’ spiritual East. The facts have changed, global power has shifted, but not so the Western feelings of total superiority. That is why the otherwise easily predictable rise and dominance of the integration-based Asia in the 21st century still looks somewhat like a miracle or bogus to most Europeans, even today.

Chapter 17: **Truths and values**

The products of human reasoning are always artificial. Any original state immediately does not make much sense to us nor has not much use until it has been transformed or modified into an artificial state. There are only two modes of reasoning. Deductive reasoning will create the artificial product of certain but valueless truth. Inductive reasoning will create the artificial product of value but uncertain truth. The function of human reasoning is to produce two artificial things: truths and values.

Chapter 18: **Ideology**

Based on its analytical, deduction-based approach and narrow views on the complexities of nature and history, the West lost its view on the holistic, long-term future relationships, consciously or unconsciously indulging itself with the uncertainties and often banalities of a postmodern, utterly deconstructed and individualist world. This post-modern insecurity the East itself has not yet encountered, and, as I will argue, it does not necessarily have to.

After Modernism (c. 1880-1950), which is understood as the age of totalities, essentialisms and meta-narratives, Western societies had deconstructed all those past meta-narratives and entered the age of Postmodernism (c. 1950-2000) (Hutcheon, 1989). For some Eastern observers it seemed that in certain areas of analytical enquiry the West was approaching its limits. Could there be anything smaller than Heisenberg's smallest possible particles 'quarks'? What is the meaning of anything once they deconstructed everything?

西方的自然科学走的是一条分析的道路，越分越细…而对这些细节之间的联系则缺乏宏观的概括。

Western science has walked down the analytical path; the more it deduced the smaller became the deducible... and (they) lost the macroscopic general perspective about how those details were related to each other. (Ji Xianlin, 2006 [5])

Man faces a serious problem in the modern world because science has pursued the objective method of cognition and has analyzed and classified phenomena until we are left with only the pieces.

(Makiguchi, in Brannen [1964])

Heisenberg's 'Uncertainty Principle' (1926), Goedel's 'Incompleteness Theorems' (1931), Wittgenstein's 'Language Games' (1926), Husserl's 'Distress in meaning' (1970), which he crowned with his *Crisis of European Sciences*, Derrida's 'Deconstructionism' (1960), Lévi-Strauss' 'Bricolage' (1962), Lorenz's Chaos Theory (1972), famous for his 'butterfly-effect', the whole idea of Boas's 'cultural relativism' (1942), meaning that all beliefs are valid and truth relative itself, etc., all of those *end-of-meaningful-science theories* contributed to undermine our beliefs in a society's certainty, consistency and continuity. If you put yourself into little things, after a hundred years it gets to you: secular Western societies therefore left it all to the individuals and their individual experiences to decide how to make sense of the world, and what to do with their minuscule lives.

The spiritual East however is different:

“Ganga ca yamuna caiva godavari sarasvati; narmada simdhu kaveri
stranar-atham prati-grhyatam.”

I am taking a bath with all these rivers Ganga, Yamuna, Godavari, Narmada, Indus, Kaveri.

同一个世界，同一个梦想

One world – One Dream.

The ‘bath sutra’ – it exists in various forms all across the Indian subcontinent – is a harmless spiritual song about the perceived unity of India and her now 1,2 billion people. The Chinese slogan for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, is derived from: 同一个中国 (one unified China) and thus not only confirms the ancient Confucius concept of ‘tianxia’ (天下, everything under heaven) or Dong Zhongshu’s ‘he er wei yi’ (合而为一, unite and become one), but also subscribes to China’s two famous policies: a) that the world should embrace (Confucian) harmony, which alleges that China’s dream is everyone else’s dream too; and b) that China is indeed ‘one’ nation, including all its 56+ minorities and, vital, problematic regions like Taiwan (台湾), Tibet (西藏), and Xinjiang (新疆). To my knowledge, there is no equivalent of such spiritual – seemingly naïve - sense of unity in recent European history.

In contrast, Western societies, after a long history of assertiveness and expansion, so it seems, do not conquer anymore, they converge. While in the analytical-based West today it is inevitably the minuscule individual in multiculturalism (EU, USA, AUS, CDN, NZ), in the integration-based East it is still the collective nation in numbers (China, Indian, but also Russia, Japan, Vietnam, Thailand, Korea, and the Middle East).

It is the old matter of seeing the trees or seeing the forest, reflected in the following two statements:

From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.

(Karl Marx, 1875)

and

有的国家占的篇幅多一点，有的少一点。这只事实求是。

Some countries take up more space, others less. That is simply how things are.

(Ji Xianlin, 2006 [6])

The former quote suggests a philosophy for the individual (each tree) and hence implies the notion of self-interest and limitation; the latter suggests a philosophy for the masses (the whole forest) and hence implies public-spiritedness and certainty.

Long-term vision and constancy, as we have seen, are intrinsic values of integration-based Eastern societies:

世上本没有路，走的人多了，便也成了路。

As more people are walking all the time, in the same spot, a path appears.

(Lu Xun, 1981)

In 2050 Iran, through political consistency, could have 100,000,000 citizens (and possibly the atom bomb). Turkey, by then, is going to be the biggest negotiating partner of Europe to the East and the EU's most populous nation (95,000,000), letting alone the 10,000,000 diasporas living scattered over the EU-27. Vietnam, with 120,000,000, could be as populous as France and Britain together. On a political level, the Communist Party of China has more members than Germany has population, the Shanghai Cooperation Council (SCC) is already (2006) the largest regional grouping in the world (and without US presence [!]), not NATO. Jairam Ramesh, former secretary of the Congress party's economic affairs department of India announced a simple truth:

We [Indians] must examine our brains, if we are not capable to lead one billion people to become the world's third largest economy! (Jairam Ramesh, 2002)

Although some Europeans have analyzed the problem of declining native populations and accepted their ethnic 'Niedergang', India, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Arab League (22 member states), Vietnam and Bangladesh etc. have no inclination towards state birth control, and China (facing a demographic aging problem) is re-considering its one-child-policy, since it could always export more diasporas to Siberia, Africa, the Middle East and Australia in order to extend its cause. The birth-rates in European countries in 2005 were merely 1.3 (Germany), 1.29 (Italy), 1.5 (France). According to the United Nations Population Division, on top of 6.435,000,000 (2005), the world is expecting an additional of 2,848,000,000 human beings in the next 50 years (UNPopulationDivision, 2007), apparently none of them white (although not necessary non-Western). The percentage of white European descendants worldwide will shrink (relatively) from 8% (2000) to roughly 2% by 2050, down from 30% in 1900. With the exception of some Anglophone nations (US, CDN, NZ, UK), who will increase in numbers due to massive immigration, the rest of European societies show a remarkable disinterest in their own (voluntary) decline, not to say ethnic suicide.

If there is going to be a 'world democracy' today, with each world citizen having exactly one vote, the declining Europeans would have better united with the neighboring Muslim world or else simply become irrelevant - if not to say impotent - in international politics. Anger, awe, fear, and the strange feeling of intimidation are relative new experiences to European intellectuals, but now suggested by the facts.

The last time European culture had been similar "seriously slackened to its bones was when the Romans assimilated the Greeks around 300 BC" (Sisci, 2008): The rise of the East is now real and inevitable.

Having established that, after only 50 years since 1950, there is now plenty of East everywhere, the question is: “Who is the West?”

Some say it is the Northern hemisphere, others say it is the White man’s thing, still others claim it is the First World, the developed world, or just the ‘elite’. Surely, we can find a nobler, if not cynical definition. I have one: The West, as I understand it, has been the victorious. That’s why Japan correctly joined the club after 1900 when defeating Russia, invading China, Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia, and in spite of being defeated in WW2 became the world’s second biggest market economy after the USA. In 2004, China finally challenged the West too by overtaking Great Britain in terms of GDP and became the 4th biggest market economy. With India surpassing Britain in 2010, is the West no more than a geographical entity?

As geography betrays us, on any Asian map of the world, the USA lies to the East. It is only natural to conclude that the only distinction between East and West that matters today, as I said before, is their different modes of thinking, and that, due to declining population in the West, a selection of Eastern people will (voluntarily or not) immigrate - not to conquer the declining West but to strengthen the equilibrium. And equilibrium it will be, for to reform either side’s civilization would mean, let us make no mistake, to discount that side’s history, beliefs, and ancestors... its everything.

Chapter 19: **Gender**

Almost alone among barbarians they (the Germanic people) are content with one wife, except a very few among them, and these not from sensuality, but because their noble birth procures for them many offers of alliance. (Tacitus, 92 AD)

In the chapters before we talked about the common metaphor of culture as a living being (e. g. Spengler, 1922; Toynbee, 1958 etc.). In this chapter I go further by enquiring about the gender, sexual orientation, and maturity of that culture.

Among the many things that impressed Marco Polo in the 13th century, and captured his reader's imagination throughout the centuries, is the absolute correct observation that a Mongol man, like the Mussulman, could take as many wives as he liked: "when a husband leaves his wife to go on a journey for more than 20 days, as soon as he has left, she takes another husband, in this she is fully entitled to do by local custom. And the men, wherever they go, take wives in the same way" (Polo, 2007).

Now, Marco often confused, I think, the Mohammedans with the Mongols, and the Mongols with the common Chinamen (of whom there were countless clans), as there were many hundreds of cultures melted together in 13th century Cathay (China). The Mongols took over Cathay (China) and established the Yuan dynasty (1264-1368) under Kublai Khan, who ruled from his court in Beijing, but they did not start polygamy in China. Far from it, although polygamy occurred in many societies around the globe, but nowhere was it as common as in all Asiatic societies; but more so the phenomenon of concubinage, that is, the maintenance of mistresses.

Concubinage does not mean having multiple wives, like in traditional polygamy, and it is certainly not a form of prostitution either. We come to that in a minute. Having multiple wives, essentially for men who could afford such a costly status symbol, was common in Hindu societies too (the mythical Krishna had 16,108 wives!), but - since the legal introduction of monogamy during the 19th century by the British Imperialists - is now legally prohibited in many parts of India; while in the Muslim world it is often legal. Until the Marriage Act of 1953, the ideal of a household in China was "one man, many wives, and as many children as possible" (Gu, 1922, Xia et. al, 2003). In Japan, polygamy was declared illegal only after 1945 when the nation was defeated in WWII and occupied by the U.S.A. But let us stop here and turn to the important facts.

Whatever the state of law today is, in China, Korea, Japan and South-East Asia in general a gentleman can only have one legal wife but may have concubines or handmaids or mistresses - as many as he can afford (Gu, 1922). That said, promiscuous young women, even if married, as long as they do not have children, are usually "available" to powerful men, married or not (Suiming, 2004). In fact, there is a wealth of data suggesting, that "a

high proportion of Chinese men are utilizing the increased access to mistresses/prostitutes (Suiming, 2004) much more often, relative, for example, to men living in the United States (Laumann et. al, 1994)”, where married men tend to leave the competition for sex partner, engage in parental activities and thus stick to one women (Gray, Yang, and Harrison, 2006). Now, this open attitude towards concubines, mistresses and handmaids is so strikingly omnipresent in Asia (especially in Thailand, Vietnam, China, Japan etc.) that it usually does alienate, if not ‘knock off’, the average American or European mind:

The Chinese feminine ideal is, for a wife to live to absolutely, selflessly for her husband. Therefore when a husband who is sick or invalided from over-work requires a handmaid, a hand rack or eye rack to enable him to get well and to fit him for his life work, the wife in China with her selflessness, gives it to him just as a good wife in Europe and America gives an arm chair or goat’s milk to her husband when he is sick or requires it. (Gu Hongming, 1922)

When the West exerted its imperial agenda, like in all historical conquest, naturally the conqueror turned to the females of the conquered. What happened after this encounter with Asian sexuality, especially during the last 150 years of Western hegemony, can only be described as the thorough construction of a fabulous, sexist ‘Asian exoticism’. This exoticism, in my view, takes the submissive Asian plaything-woman at the core of the concept of Western master-race dominance over all Asian nations and their women. Asia became ‘feminized’:

“I shall choose a little yellow-skinned woman with black hair and cat’s eyes. She must be pretty. Not much bigger than a doll...”

...are the words of Louis Marie-Julien Viaud (1850-1923), alias Pierre Loti, officer in the French Navy stationed in Nagasaki, in his book *Madame Chrysantheme* (1887), who engaged in term-marriages with Japanese ‘rashamen’ or “concubines of Westerners” (Loti, 2001).

This kind of representation of Asian woman and Asian sexuality is prominent in hundreds of art pieces, fiction, film, television and musicals, and almost always entails the inter-racial romance between European or American men with Asian women, for example in John Luther Long’s *Madame Butterfly* (Long, 2002), John Paris’ *Kimono* (Paris, 1947), Arthur Golden’s *Memoirs of a Geisha* (Golden, 1997), Max Clavell’s *Shogun* and *Tai-pan* (Clavell, 1986), and, of course, Marguerite Duras’ notorious *L’Amant*, in which a French teenage girl becomes the submissive - sinosized - mistress of a much older Chinese gentleman (Duras, 1984). And I haven’t even mentioned more hedonistic works such as Wei Hui’s *Shanghai Baby* (Wei, 2002) or Chu Sue’s *Beijing Doll* (Chu, 2004).

As Patricia Lin in her studies on *Invented Asia* (2007) argues: “sexual encounters historically were initially predominantly between Western white men and Asian woman given the nature of colonial and business ventures

which tended to favor situations where primarily men were sent out into Asian territories.” This is testified by the fact that, vice versa, Chinese and Japanese writers found it naturally to depict dominant Western man as evil, stout and ugly 洋鬼子 ‘(yang guizi, foreign devils from the ocean) (Zhou, 200).

What happened in Asia before and between the I. and II. Opium Wars (1839-1842; 1856-1860), the World Wars (1914-1918; 1938-1945), the Korea War (1950-1953), the occupation of Japan (1945-1952), Vietnam (1959-1975), and American hegemony in South-East Asia (1945-), accompanied by Western mass media and cultural consumer entertainment only strengthened the objectification of Asia – Asia as an all-perverted - animalistic if you like - place of Western sexual dominance versus Asian sexual submission:

The most obvious use of the postwar American discourse about Japanese ‘feudalism’ in justifying the U.S. occupation was to render the Japanese as helpless and naïve as women and children supposedly were. (Shibusawa, 2006, p. 73)

Butterflies, amber, pottery, calligraphy, lotus flowers, cherry trees, dolls, silk, kimonos... are those national symbols of a masculine or feminine nature? Western observers found it to be of a feminine nature, and many more things like the absence of more manly sports (like soccer, football, baseball, basketball, athletics etc.), the toy-like houses and cities they encountered, too, and started a “discourse of femininity and masculinity, or femininity and maturity merged, male activity and female passivity”, or simply about “race and manliness”... (Shibusawa, 2006, p. 73), a discourse that did not occur, for example, about the defeated Germans, who after all were a Western culture and considered, comparable to the Americans and the British, “a mature people” by all means (Douglas McArthur, in Shibusawa, 2006, p. 55).

Not only gender and the level maturity but also such concepts as ‘love’ and ‘privacy’ were believed to be of an altogether different nature in Asia. The crux was this: If in Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, China and India it is still the case, even in 2008, that most marriages were arranged or ‘match-made’, and that ‘marriage’ is still considered the “union of two families” rather than two individuals, or that a man has to marry and have a child, preferable a boy, before he is considered a real ‘man’, while keeping in mind that today’s situation in those country already is a huge improvement to what was going on in Asia let us say 20-30 years ago (Lü, 2005), some Western authors argued and still like too see it this way that: ‘Love has nothing to do with marriage in Asia’ (Nilson, 1988), or, in defense of Asian values, that the concept of ‘love’ in (Confucian) China and tutti quanti is inherently different from that in the (Christian) West, and can (and must) be understood ‘in the Asian context’ only (Lin, 2007).

Similar, in Asia’s collective societies, the concept of ‘privacy’ must be understood ‘in that Asian context’ only (McDougall, 2002). It might be helpful to keep this rule in mind: In China, ‘love’ and ‘privacy’ are best expressed

by ‘爱(ai)’ and ‘私 (si)’. Korean and Japanese language speaker can read and understand these two characters, but pronounce them differently and also transliterate them into their own alphabets, Hangul and Hiragana respectively. The concept of individual ‘privacy’ which we take for granted in the West was imported into ‘Hangul’ or ‘Katagana’, simply because... well, because there was no generic word for it in classical Japan or Korean languages before. Linguistic distance correlates with cultural distance - only if one has gone through the painful ordeal of mastering a foreign language will one understand and appreciate the foreign culture and its distinctive values beneath it.

Some feminists, and also men can be great feminists for that matter, have argued, that the whole image of ‘Asian playthings’ is the construct of an obsessive Western mind. But then, so is the stock market and French cuisine. No idea that has occupied so many minds over hundreds of years can be that far away from the actuality of human life.

Unless someone speaks a foreign language fluent and is familiar with the cultural nuances those relationship requires, foreign observers are unlikely to understand and appreciate the cultural context of let’s say ‘enjo kosai’ in Japan, a compensated dating of young schoolgirls by middle-aged men (*atimes*, 2008/05), modern concubinage in Hong Kong or Shanghai, or the rampage prostitution in most East-Asian countries, just as an East-Asian person will have difficulties to understand European ‘swinger culture’, where couples exchange their sex partners, even wives, mixed saunas, or the naturist or ‘nudist culture’ valued in many European societies.

But all relative it is not: In the past it has always been the Western male colonialist or imperialist who came to Asia, not the Eastern male colonialist or imperialist who came to Europe. Where women dress like dolls, are submissive, know that their husbands will cheat anyway, where prostitution is cheap, people are beautiful, slim, young, even easy to marry, where languages are unreadable, and where Asian body types, in particular their exotic facial features, skin color and genital configurations seemed to arouse Western men an to the very heights of exoticism and bizarreness (Lin, 2007), there will be a market for it:

I have met the plaything which I have, vaguely perhaps, desired all my life: a little talking cat. [...] her head, the size of your first, is poised, and seems unreal, on a child’s neck, a neck too long and too thin; and her tiny nothingness of a body is lost in the folds of an extravagant dress, hugely flowered with great gilded chrysanthemums. (Pierre Loti, 2001)

Dominant groups, therefore, are able to transmit their ideologies and sexual categories through powerful cultural means of subjugation.

Just as Asia had to bend down and suffer under Western military and economical might, so it did under the

‘dominance vs. submission’ sexuality catechism. As long as those occupied cultures did not ‘westernize’ to an approved and satisfying level of moral conduct set by Europe and America, they remained:

“stripped of all privileges and left with an ascribed eroticism that invites sexual engagement, exploitation and ultimate abandonment” (Lin, 2007).

Now, as all the above authors undeniable play on the ‘animal instinct’ of bad Western wolves and innocent Asian sheep, I do not quite get myself to agree with this ‘chronicles of victimization’ of Asia, that only plays further into the hands of Western dominance. On the contrary, I do believe that in our modern world civility will prevail over barbarism, or, as one of China’s major entertainer once said:

We urge more foreigners to marry Chinese women!
(Cheng Long [成龙], alias Jackie Chan)

Well, Mr. Chan, this is what Western men usually do in China. Or, at least that is what they aspire to do - and not only in China, but in the whole of East-Asia. To put this into socio-economic perspective: in an international world, Ms. Asia has already pinched Ms. West’s boyfriend. “She” will make sure that her culture prevails, and, believe it or not, “he” will spend his money on her and, facing the shortage of children and crisis back home, he will bid his future on her and her kin.

On a philosophical level, the idea of a masculine West and a feminine East that transcendent all human experiences and forms a sense of liberation and harmony - Blaise Pascal called it ‘logique du cœur’ or ‘wisdom of the heart’ - is a popular concept of dualism, also evident in Yin and Yang (阴阳): the feminine or negative principle in nature, or moon, and the masculine or positive principle in nature, or sun.

Jim Garrison, in his *Civilization and the Transformation of Power*, took this duality to the most profound level, when he analyses today’s gender politics inflected through folk-wisdom and mythology (Garrison, 2000). He describes how the suppression of ‘Mother Earth’, the archetypal feminine, has led us to the brink of world catastrophe, heralded by the ‘Crisis of Europe’ in works such as Meadows’ *The Limits to Growth* (1972), Spencer’s *The Decline of the West* (1893), and Husserl’s *The Crisis of European Sciences* (1970). The power plays between ‘Mother mind’ and ‘Father force’, the violent tension between ‘Mahimata’ (Mother Earth) and Lord Shiva (god of destruction) – all cultures have their myths about this duality and can follow its discourse:

Here – the destructive power of the short-sighted masculine West, who narrow-mindedly focuses on objects, not relations, and who wants to exploit and manipulate those objects in order to control nature and all things.

There - the gentle power of the long-sighted feminine East, who holistically perceives the world's interconnectiveness of all objects, who cultivate and appreciates them in order to balance the relations among all things.

Chapter 20: **The dialectics of dichotomy**

Having seen that the East-West dichotomy is omnipresent in history, philosophy, demographics, religion, culture, ideology, even sexuality, let us now, in looking at the dialectics of dichotomy, expand its scope to more exotic fields such as physiology, geopolitics, and cognition:

Cerebral determinism

This notion is linked to human physiology.

We observe, in most cultures, the grammatical division of nouns into masculine and feminine, and in all cultures, the semantic division of names and objects into male and female. It means that gender is an innate sense people have of themselves and others, including animals and objects. This is an example of our human physiology, the structure of our sexes, correctly corresponding to and portraying categorizations of things in the world we perceive. Next, we all are able to distinguish between matter and idea, in philosophy it is called Cartesian dualism (*Cambridge Dictionary*, 1999), which is an example of the intimate relationship between our mind and brain correctly corresponding and portraying categorizations of mind and matter in the world we perceive. Likewise, the ways we think about the world we perceive with respect to our categorizations of matter and idea, are causally determined or influenced by our linguistic system (Sapir, 1983). Since our physiology projects itself on the world we perceive, this makes me wonder whether our definition of an inductive East and an analytical West is another example of the structure of our cognitive system - the two cerebral hemispheres - correctly corresponding and portraying categorizations of the world we perceive, namely the East-West dichotomy.

The Theory of shared labor

The second notion I would like to bring forward is the argument of shared labor in a geopolitical context, not in a Marxist or Weberian sense to explain labor shared within a society, but for the labor shared among civilizations.

The definition of East-West dichotomy (from Greek *dicha*, “apart”, and *tomos*, “cutting”) is a form of logical division consisting of the separation of the geopolitical map into two hemispheres, one of which has and the other has not in each case perpetually exhibited the tendency for analytically-based reasoning or integration-based reasoning. In any population, just as we may divide its members along a vertical scale into professional individuals and individuals who are not professionals (and each of these may be subdivided again), similarly we may divide cultures along a horizontal scale into analytical-based societies and societies which are integration-based. Because each side contains what the other side is lacking, East and West together form a whole that is imperfect without

both of its parts. If we now come to see the division into integration-based and analytically-based civilizations as a form of specialization in ‘cooperative labor’ with specific tasks and roles well adjusted to increase efficiency and intellectual output of humankind, we could imagine a certain regulatory mechanism or ‘collective consciousness’ that shifts whole populations - voluntary or involuntary - into their respective geopolitical roles and provides them with specific tasks so as to serve the greater good of the whole.

Ideas about a human ‘hive mind’ are not new to us; however the mere mentioning of any insect-human social familiars still causes confusion (Cooley and Rieff, 1983/2003). Not so long after Darwin, in his *Origin of Species* (1859) observed group strategies and social organization in animals, modern biologists and sociologists compare the kingdoms of ants (and occasional beehives) to human state-building and consumerism (Spencer, 1857; Hölldobler and Wilson, 1990, 1994; Weber, 1991; Marion, 1999). Philosophers tell us that there is a certain unifying moral force within society, psychologists talk about ‘conformity’ or ‘group identify’, as opposed to a society of total egoists and independent individuals (Cooley and Rieff, 1983/2003). If this is true in groups, why not in civilizations too: in order to be most productive and efficient, labor has to be shared.

To my knowledge, no Western culture has ever produced anything like the works of Confucius, and no Eastern culture has ever produced anything like Plato’s ideals. The notion of the share of labor makes me think that the division of an analytically-based West and an integration-based East could be no coincidence in human evolution, but a collective behavior to fully exploit and develop all the cognitive capacities of the human race. Note that there is nothing in this world that is not shared by all humankind. It is just that the West grew up to excel at this, and the East grew up to excel at that and that all we should do is to bring it together in order to express all the knowledge.

Cognitive dualism

The third notion is derived from Dewey (1859-1952). In his book *Quest for Certainty* (1929), where he discusses the ‘doctrine of two truths’, the sacred and the profane, which in turn is derived from dualism.

Dualism, in its simplest notion, is related to binary thinking, that is, to systems of thought that are two-valued: valid/invalid, true/false, good/bad or right/wrong. The doctrine of two truths however is more concretely engaged in the dualistic response to the conflict between spiritualism and science, the spiritual and the secular. Dewey sees all problems of philosophy derived from dualistic oppositions, particular between the spirit and the physical matter, but it is his conclusion that is most significant: Dewey proposes the rejecting of Hegel’s dialectical idealism (that recommended the synthesis of oppositions seen as theses versus antitheses) on the grounds that the whole (synthesis) is never the sum of its parts (thesis and antithesis). Conclusively, contradictions are universal: it is ‘either or’ or ‘both but incommensurable’, as for example ‘ebb and flow’, ‘Yin and Yang’, or as the Chinese-English saying goes: 鱼和熊掌, 不可兼得 - You can’t have your cake and eat it, unabridged: “鱼, 我所欲也 ;

熊掌，亦我所欲也，二者不可得兼，舍鱼而取熊掌者也” (Mencius, 1A,4).

The study of the ‘other’ - Sartre’s xenophobic masochism ‘L’enfer, c’est les autres’, Habermas’ paranoid ‘Der Blick des anderen’, or the Indian philosophy of ‘Desi-Pardesi’ (Inhabitor vs. Outsider), the silly but deadly Communist-Capitalist game, all of them are simply saying: I am not you, and you are not me. So, what is the argument? Do we not all like to disagree, not because we hold the better reasons, but because we “can” disagree. Isn’t it our right so say, that “although ‘your’ country is made of gold, ‘I’ don’t like it!” “Do I not have the right to say ‘No?’ It was in structuralism, famously represented by Claude Lévi-Strauss, where one did not only organize human thought and culture into binary oppositions but attached hierarchies to them as well. For some reason in European history of thought, ‘rational’ is usually privileged and associated with men, while ‘emotional’ is inferior and associated with women. ‘Blond hair’ in Western cultures is privileged and associated to goodness, while ‘Black hair’ is inferior and associated to evil, and so on (Boon, 1972; Goddard, 1982). Is Mr. Lévi-Strauss right if one wanted to say that the ‘West’ is privileged and associated with ‘mastering the theories’, while the ‘East’ is inferior and associated with ‘mastering the arts’? Surely, cultural values and prejudices vary over time. What does not, is the underlying, psychological calibrated mechanism of all human reasoning: its cognitive dualism.

To sum up, the above three notions demonstrate what seems to be a law of nature, namely that the East-West difference has been found consistently from the time of the Greeks 2500 years ago to our present day, and that it is consistent with assumptions about our anatomy, the cerebral hemispheres, the dual nature of our reasoning and the geopolitical concept of sharing labor (by way of collective consciousness) for the greater good and a higher efficiency in intellectual output. Because the human geopolitical situation is a mere extension of our physical and cognitive systems inherent in each of us, we have reason to believe that our societies will continue to be predominantly dualistic in the near future, with an integration-based Eastern hemisphere and an analytically-based Western hemisphere.

Chapter 21: Problems with the dichotomy

Chapter 22: **The future of the dichotomy**

Chapter 23: **The author**

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Pattberg, Thorsten (2009), *The East-West dichotomy*, <http://www.east-west-dichotomy.com>

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